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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a final order of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Wasatch County, State of Utah. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellees' Restatement of Issues Presented on Appeal 
First Issue: Did the trial court err when it enforced an unambiguous default 
provision in a form Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "REPC") in what the Appellants 
(the "Selvigs") are now calling a "quiet title" action, where the Selvigs never raised the 
"quiet title" argument in the trial court, where the Selvigs admit they have dropped any 
claim to title, where at trial the Selvigs insisted that each and every provision of the REPC 
was enforceable in this action, and where the "quiet title" argument rests on an ipse dixit 
assertion that the Selvigs "terminated" the Parties' written agreement, but where the 
Selvigs never had a general right to "terminate" said agreement and work a forfeiture on 
Appellees (collectively "Blockbuster"). 
Standard of Review: To the extent a court's construction of a contract is 
based on the words of the contract, it is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. To the extent it is based on extrinsic evidence, it is a question 
of fact subject to limited review. Such findings are reviewed in a light most 
supportive of the findings of the trier of fact, and are not disturbed when 
they are based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence. Kimball v. 
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Campbell 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). The trial court's finding that the 
Parties intended the REPC and the LPA to be a single agreement, applicable 
to all the Parties5 dealings and to the facts of this case is subject to limited 
review. 
Preservation of The Issue: The Selvigs failed to comply with Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), which requires a citation to the record showing that the 
issue was preserved in the trial court, or a statement of grounds for seeking 
review of an unpreserved issue. 
Second Issue: Did the trial court contravene the election of remedies "doctrine" by 
enforcing the default provision of the REPC where the Selvigs never raised the election 
of remedies "doctrine" argument in the trial court, where the Selvigs are confusing a 
procedural rule known as the election of remedies "doctrine" with an express contractual 
provision requiring return of a deposit before pursuing other remedies, and where the 
Court of Appeals has already held that the "doctrine" is distinct from, and compatible 
with, such contractual provisions? 
Standard of Review: To the extent a court's construction of a contract is 
based on the words of the contract, it is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. To the extent it is based on extrinsic evidence, it is a question 
of fact subject to limited review. Such findings are reviewed in a light most 
supportive of the findings of the trier of fact, and are not disturbed when 
they are based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence. Kimball v. 
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Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). The trial court's finding that the 
Parties intended the REPC and the LPA to be a single agreement, applicable 
to all the Parties' dealings is subject to limited review. 
Preservation of The Issue: The Selvigs failed to comply with Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), which requires a citation to the record showing that the 
issue was preserved in the trial court, or a statement of grounds for seeking 
review of an unpreserved issue. 
Third Issue: Did the trial court err in holding that Blockbuster did not waive the 
right to assert the default provision of the REPC, where this Court has explicitly held that 
such provisions are not waivable, where the Selvigs are confusing a procedural rule 
known as the election of remedies "doctrine" with an express contractual provision 
requiring the return of a deposit before pursuing other remedies, even if said "doctrine" 
were applicable here, a demand for an election of remedies can be made at any time, and 
where the extracontractual "wrong" theory rests on an ipse dixit assertion that the Selvigs 
"terminated" the Parties5 written agreement, but where the Selvigs never had a general 
right to "terminate" said agreement and work a forfeiture on Blockbuster? 
Standard of Review: "Whether a party has effectuated a waiver is a 
mixed question of law and fact.. . . [W]hether the trial court employed the 
proper standard of waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed for 
correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are 
factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations. 
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Accordingly, [the reviewing court] grant[s] broadened discretion to the trial 
court's findings when reviewing questions of waiver." United Park City 
Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mt Fonds, 140 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Utah 
2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Preservation of The Issue: The Selvigs failed to comply with Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), which requires a citation to the record showing that the 
issue was preserved in the trial court, or a statement of grounds for seeking 
review of an unpreserved issue. 
Fourth Issue: Did the trial court err in dismissing the Selvigs' unjust enrichment 
claim where the Selvigs insisted at trial that the provisions of the Parties' written 
agreement governed their claims, where the alleged "unjust enrichment" consisted of 
Blockbuster "wrongfully" retaining possession of the subject property after the Selvigs 
"terminated" said agreement, where the Selvigs never had a general right to "terminate" 
said agreement and work a forfeiture on Blockbuster, and where the Selvigs admit they 
have dropped any claim for title to or possession of the relevant real property? 
Preservation of The Issue: The Selvigs failed to comply with Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), which requires a citation to the record showing that the 
issue was preserved in the trial court, or a statement of grounds for seeking 
review of an unpreserved issue. 
Fifth Issue: Did the trial court err in holding that Highland did not waive a claim 
for attorney fees where this Court has expressly held that a request for attorney fees may 
4 
be raised in the trial court at any time prior to the entry of final judgment, and where 
Highland requested attorney fees prior to the entry of final judgment? 
Standard of Review: "Whether a party has effectuated a waiver is a mixed 
question of law and fact. "Whether a party has effectuated a waiver is a 
mixed question of law and fact.. . . [Wjhether the trial court employed the 
proper standard of waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed for 
correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are 
factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations. 
Accordingly, [the reviewing court] grant[s] broadened discretion to the trial 
court's findings when reviewing questions of waiver." United Park City 
Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mt. Fonds, 140 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Utah 
2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Preservation of The Issue: The Selvigs failed to comply with Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), which requires a citation to the record showing that the 
issue was preserved in the trial court, or a statement of grounds for seeking 
review of an unpreserved issue. 
Issues Presented on Cross Appeal 
First Issue: Did the trial court err in cutting off Highland's award of attorney fees 
and costs on the grounds that Highland could have avoided a trial by raising the winning 
issue of the REPC's default provision prior to trial where the Selvigs had previously taken 
the position that some provisions of the REPC were no longer operative, where the trial 
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court had expressly held that the extent to which the REPC survived the Parties' 
subsequent writing was a disputed question of fact reserved for trial, and where it was not 
until the trial that the Selvigs irrevocably committed themselves to the position that each 
and every provision of the REPC was enforceable? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court's findings of fact in support of 
an award of fees are sufficient is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. The trial court's determination of a reasonable attorney fee 
award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 902 
P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). The trial court's award of costs will be 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325, 351 
(Utah 2005). A trial court abuses its discretion if its conclusions are 
"arbitrary, capricious, or not based on adequate findings of fact or on the 
law." Pacer Sport and Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616, 616 (Utah 1975). 
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved in Defendants' 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Award of Attorney's Fees 
and Costs to Defendants at 9-12, R. 1387-90, in Defendants' Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Memorandum of Costs at 1, 8-10, R. 
1365-67, 1374, in Defendants' Memorandum of Costs, R. 1213-25, in 
Defendants' Request for Attorneys' Fees, R. 1248-73, and in the Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Request for Attorneys' Fees at 1-
2,4-5,R. 1408-09, 1411-12. 
Second Issue: Did the trial court err in making findings of facts on a Motion for 
Judgment as A Matter of Law under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), where some findings were 
disputed but immaterial to the court's ultimate ruling, and where said findings were 
adverse to Highland but Highland had not yet put on its case? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's application of Rule 41(b) is 
reviewed for correctness. C&YCorp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 
47, 53 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Preservation of The Issue: These finding were made in the trial court's 
final ruling on the merits of the case, and could not, therefore, have been 
raised by Highland before this appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, OR REGULATIONS 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Facts Giving Rise to The Case 
In 2003, Steven and Barbara Selvig decided to move to Utah and try their hand at 
innkeeping. R. 1514 at 38-39. So, in November of 2003, the Selvigs purchased the 
Kastle Inn (the "Inn"), a large home on five acres in Midway which was being used as a 
bed and breakfast. R. 1514 at 40, 60. 
The experiment did not go well. 
For about 21 months, the Selvigs operated the Inn at a loss. R. 1514 at 60; R. 1515 
at310;R. 1516 at 819-21. They had a first mortgage of over $560,000. R. 18 (setting out 
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balance of first mortgage). They took out a second mortgage which eventually carried a 
balance of about $70,000. R. 18 (setting out balance of second mortgage). The Selvigs 
had to take in over $4,000 a month just to cover the mortgage payments. R. 1515 at 355. 
They were sometimes forced to use credit cards to make their mortgage payments. R. 
1516 at 797, 818. 
In 2004, the Selvigs made an unsuccessful attempt to sell the Inn, listing it for a 
time with a realtor. R. 1514 at 259. 
On March 17,2005, the Selvigs put the Inn on the market again, signing a six 
month listing agreement. R. 1514 at 260. Appellee Joan Steed approached them about 
purchasing the Inn a couple of months later. R. 1514 at 63.l 
On June 12, 2005, the Parties entered into an agreement for the purchase of the 
Inn. R. 1415 at 71. Mrs. Steed and her husband are the developers of Utah Mini-Ranches 
in Duchesne. Mrs. Steed has experience in real estate transactions, but is not a Utah Real 
Estate Agent. By agreement of the Parties, Mrs. Steed prepared the documentation, 
consisting of a standard printed REPC with three addenda. R. 1514 at 71-72; R. 1515 at 
456. Addendum 1 contains a description of the Inn property, Addendum 2 provides that 
1
 The Selvigs admit they deliberately scheduled the sale for September 30, 2005 -
after the listing agreement expired - to avoid paying a commission, and that they never 
paid the realtor. R. 1514 at 260; R. 1515 at 455; R. 1516 at 574. 
At trial, when Mr. Selvig first testified about the second listing agreement, he spun 
a detailed yarn about the listing having expired before Mrs. Steed approached them. R. 
1514 at 61. He was forced to admit on cross-examination that he had lied. R. 1514 at 
260-61. 
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the contents of the Inn are included in the transaction, and Addendum 3 more fully 
describes the $125,000 down payment, which consisted of $1,000 in earnest money, 
$74,000 in cash to be paid at closing, and a $50,000 "construction credit" on a cabin to be 
built by a Steed entity, Highland Development, Inc., should the Selvigs build at Utah 
Mini-Ranches. See, e.g., R. 981-92, and Addendum A hereto. 
The REPC contains an integration clause, stating, 
COMPLETE CONTRACT. This instrument (together with its 
Addenda, any attached Exhibits, and Seller disclosures) constitutes 
the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes all prior 
dealings between the parties. This Contract Cannot be changed 
except by written agreement of the parties. 
R. 992 at f 14, and Addendum A hereto. 
The agreed upon sales price was $759,139, consisting of the down payment, 
valued at $125,000, and the assumption or payoff of the balance of the Selvigs' two 
mortgages, which totaled $634,139. R. 1514 at 77-81; R. 992 and Addendum A hereto. 
Mrs. Steed paid the $1,000 in earnest money at the signing. R. 1514 at 74, 77; R. 1516 at 
579. 
The agreement unambiguously includes the contents of the Inn. Addendum 2 
states, "The majority of items seen by Buyer on June 9, 2005 will be apart [sic] of this 
transaction with the exception of the items Barbara Selvig pointed out to the buyer. There 
will be several personal items which will be mutually agreed upon by Buyer and Seller on 
or before June 19, 2005." R. 983 and Addendum A hereto. 
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Mrs. Selvig testified that she walked through the Inn with Mrs. Steed on 
June 9, 2005, showing her the contents of the Inn, as set forth in Addendum 2. Mrs. 
Selvig testified that the items she pointed out, those they were not leaving with the Inn, 
consisted solely of the Selvigs' bed and dresser, their television, a dining room table, 
some personal dishes and cookware, and the Selvigs5 personal effects. R. 1516 at 577-78. 
Addendum 3 more fully described the $125,000 down payment, as follows, 
Buyer will put $75,000. cash down on this purchase, $1000.00 
6/12/05 and $74,000. at closing 9/30/05 and will credit $50,000.00 in 
construction cost to build a home for Steven W. Selvig and Barbara 
D. Selvig. Total true value of the down payment is $125,000.00. 
Buyer will assume first and second mortgage, which will be current 
at time of closing. If there is a problem with assumption, buyer will 
pay existing loans off at time of closing. Seller will pay mortgage 
payment for July, August and September, 2005, on both mortgages. 
Insurance will be prorated. 
Highland Development, Inc. will design and build a 28 x 44 ft. cabin, 
6/12 pitch complete finished with 2 bedrooms, 1 - full bath, 
carpet/vinyl, heating system, loft and other items which come with 
this house package which will include Lot #139, a prime view lot at 
no extra charge, located in Utah Mini Ranches Subdivision in 
Duchesne, Utah. 84021. 
The minimum cost value for the 28 ft. by 44 ft. house with lot 139 
without any extras, will be $109,950. The minimum cost for a two 
car garage, 24 ft. x 28 ft., with two windows, electric door and 
concrete pad will be $18,000. 
The additional cost for power tap, water tap, and installation of a 
septic tank system will be $9800.00. 
The seller may exceed these costs with upgrades and additions mutually 
agreed upon during the finalization of the floorplan which will take place 
on or before Sept. 1, 2005. 
10 
Seller will allow construction start to take place on or before 
February 1, 2006. 
R. 981 and Addendum A hereto (emphasis added). 
As set forth above, all mentions of Lot 139 are as part of the cabin "package/5 and 
the sole consideration offered to the Selvigs in connection with the cabin "package" is a 
$50,000 "credit." As the Selvigs admit, there is no provision in the agreement stating that 
Lot 139 is compensation for the contents of the Inn, or requiring Blockbuster to convey 
the lot if they never built a cabin. R. 1515 at 307-08. As the Selvigs also admit, the 
agreed price under the Parties agreement - $759,139 - reflects only that $50,000 credit, 
and not any value attributed to Lot 139 as a separate item of consideration for the contents 
of the Inn. R. 1515 at 339, 403-04; R. 1516 at 862. 
The "at no extra charge" language refers to the fact that the price reflected in 
Addendum 3 is the cost for a basic cabin package on a standard lot at Utah Mini-Ranches. 
Lot 139 was a prime view lot at the crest of a hill. Under normal circumstances, there 
would have been a $15,000 to $20,000 premium added to the price of the cabin package 
for Lot 139. This premium was being waived as part of the Parties5 agreement. R. 823 at 
14-15; R. 1518 at 1107-08. 
The agreement was set to close on September 30, 2005. See note 1, supra. 
According to Mrs. Selvig, the Parties knew by approximately August 19,2005, that the 
Selvigs' second mortgage could not be assumed, and that, if the Steeds were to undertake 
a novation of the first mortgage, releasing the Selvigs from liability on the note, it would 
take 30 to 45 days. R. 1516 at 763-65, 768-71. 
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In the meantime, the Steeds had inspected the property, which was 35 to 40 years 
old. R. 1518 at 1386. They determined that substantial repairs were necessary before the 
Inn would appraise well enough to support the financing the Steeds wished to obtain. 
The Steeds wanted to avoid triggering any "due on sale5' clauses in the existing mortgages 
while they made those repairs. R. 1514 at 112, 114. 
Nevertheless, the Selvigs wanted to go on a vacation, so they asked Mrs. Steed if 
the closing date could be moved up. It was rescheduled for September 23, 2005. R. 1515 
at 526; R. 1516 at 589. 
The Parties had not finalized a floor plan for the Selvigs' Duchesne cabin by 
September 1, 2005, as called for by Addendum 3. To the extent this provision could be 
waived by the Selvigs,2 Mr. Selvig testified that they waived it. R. 1514 at 278. 
On September 23, 2005, the Parties entered into the Lease to Purchase Agreement, 
under which Blockbuster Enterprises, L.C., would assume payments on the first and 
second mortgages for a year, then pay off the mortgages. R. 979 and Addendum B 
hereto; R. 1514 at 112, 115. Mrs. Steed gave the Selvigs $74,000 - all the remaining cash 
to which they were entitled under the agreement. R. 1514 at 114, 129. 
2
 If Blockbuster had put on its case, Mrs. Steed would have testified that the 
deadlines for planning and beginning construction of the cabin at Utah Mini-Ranches 
were for their benefit. While the Steeds were willing to build a cabin at the price 
specified, costs were continually rising, and they did not want that obligation pending for 
years. Hence, Addendum 3, specifically states, "Seller [the Selvigs] will allow 
construction start to take place on or before February 1, 2006." 
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The Selvigs signed a warranty deed conveying the Inn to Blockbuster, and gave it 
to Mrs. Steed. R. 1515 at 347. As the Selvigs admitted, there was no escrow established, 
and there were no written or oral restrictions placed by the Selvigs on Mrs. Steed's use of 
the deed. R. 1515 at 337-38, 340-42, 348. The Selvigs claim that Mrs. Steed stated that 
she would not record the deed until she had paid off both mortgages, but that is disputed, 
and no such term is found anywhere in the Parties' integrated agreement. R. 1514 at 126; 
R. 1515 at 337-38. 
In any event, there is no dispute that, on September 23, 2005, the Selvigs 
transferred possession of the Inn, if not title, to Blockbuster. R. 1514 at 130. 
The Selvigs made short work of the $74,000 cash they received that day. Until 
they received that money, they had been unable even to make the September mortgage 
payment on the Inn, and that payment was late. R. 1516 at 802, 804-05. They made the 
mortgage payment, as well as large payments on credit card balances or Mr. Selvig's 
child support arrearages. Within about three months, the $75,000 was gone. R. 1514 at 
273; R. 1515 at 372, 527; R. 1516 at 806-817. 
Blockbuster, for its part, began performing on the Lease to Purchase Agreement. 
Blockbuster began making the payments on both mortgages. The Selvigs continued to 
receive the mortgage statements and coupons, and would forward them to an employee at 
Utah Mini-Ranches for payment. R. 1516 at 856. The Selvigs, therefore, were always 
aware of the status of those loans. 
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Blockbuster also began paying all taxes, insurance, and other expenses associated 
with the Inn. R. 1515 at 374. 
On March 28, 2006 - six months early - Blockbuster paid off the $69,990.57 
balance on the second mortgage. R. 1514 at 134, 136; R. 1515 at 383; R. 1518 at 1202. 
Blockbuster also began making substantial repairs and upgrades to the Inn, and 
invested nearly $300,000 in improving the Inn. R. 1088. 
The Selvigs assert that, under the LP A, Blockbuster was obligated to pay off the 
balance of the first mortgage on September 1, 2006.3 That date came and went. 
Blockbuster made a timely payment on the mortgage, but did not pay off the balance. If 
the LPA, indeed, required the payoff to occur on September 1, 2006, this was a breach by 
Blockbuster. However, Mrs. Selvig testified that they "waived" that breach. R. 1517 at 
1012. 
Not only did the Selvigs waive the breach - if there was one, see note 3, supra -
the Selvigs continued to treat Blockbuster as the owners of the property. In fact, toward 
the end of September 2006, the Selvigs began negotiating a deal to reinstall themselves in 
the Inn as "innkeepers" who would reopen the bed and breakfast. R. 1515 at 319, 323-24. 
The Parties dispute whether this negotiation was initiated by Mrs. Steed or the 
Selvigs, but throughout the negotiations, it is undisputed that the Selvigs behaved as if 
3
 The LPA is internally inconsistent on this point. The LPA states that the payoff 
shall occur "[o]n the 13th month," which would have been in October 2006. However, in 
what appears to be a drafting error, the date of payoff is set at September 1, 2006. R. 979 
and Addendum B hereto. 
14 
Blockbuster were the owner of the Inn. The Selvigs expected Blockbuster to cover all 
expenses of running the Inn, and to make repairs and upgrades to the Inn, including 
finishing off additional space which the Selvigs would occupy as innkeepers. R. 1516 at 
702-704; R. 1517 at 880-81, 898, 910, 912-13. The Selvigs, for their part, anticipated 
living in the Inn rent free, opening the Inn as a bed and breakfast on a limited schedule, 
and receiving 80 percent of the income. R. 1515 at 323-24; R. 1517 at 892-97. 
The deal began to unravel when the Selvigs demanded that Mrs. Steed add the 
NFL Sunday Ticket to the Inn's cable subscription. Mrs. Selvig admits that Mrs. Steed 
became annoyed when Mrs. Selvig sent her an e-mail stating that Mr. Selvig would not 
move back into the Inn until the NFL Sunday Ticket was available. R. 1517 at 912, 915-
16. 
The negotiations ended on October 3, 2006, in a telephone call between Mrs. Steed 
and Mr. Selvig. Mr. Selvig was complaining about the number of projects that would 
need to be completed before the Inn could be reopened, and told Mrs. Steed that he 
"would not work for $6.00 an hour." R. 1514 at 187; R. 1515 at 376-77. Mr. Selvig 
testified that the telephone call became "nasty," and the Parties called off their 
negotiations to reopen the Inn with the Selvigs as innkeepers. Id, Shortly after that call 
ended, Mrs. Steed recorded the warranty deed. R. 1514 at 191. 
Mr. Selvig claims that, during that heated telephone call, he gave Mrs. Steed notice 
that he was "terminating" the agreement for the purchase of the Inn. However, he has 
always been vague about what he actually said. R. 1514 at 187-88, 249-58. 
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In any event, neither the REPC nor the LPA contains any provision granting the 
Selvigs a general right to "terminate" the agreement in the event of any breach. To the 
contrary, the default provision of the REPC states in pertinent part: 
DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect to either retain the 
Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the 
Earnest Money Deposit and sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights.. . . 
Where a Section of this Contract provides a specific remedy, the 
parties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights 
which might otherwise be available under common law. 
R. 991 and Addendum A hereto. In other words, the only "forfeiture" allowed by the 
REPC consisted of a right in the seller to keep the earnest money as liquidated damages. 
Any other remedy required a return of the earnest money as a precondition to suit. Of 
course, if the remedy sought were "rescission," the Selvigs would also have had to tender 
back the remainder of the consideration they received. 
Both the Selvigs admit that, at no time did they ever say anything which would 
have put Blockbuster on notice that the Selvigs considered themselves to be the owners of 
the Inn, or that they believed themselves to have any right to retake possession of the Inn. 
R. 1515 at 324, 331-32, 378; R. 1517 at 875, 877, 885, 918-19, 920-21. In fact, even 
after the Selvigs filed this lawsuit, they allowed Blockbuster to continue making the 
mortgage payments on the Inn. The Selvigs both admit that they never told Blockbuster 
to stop making mortgage payments because the Parties' agreement had supposedly been 
"terminated." R. 1517 at 874, 885. 
Nevertheless, the Selvigs somehow became convinced that any breach of the 
agreement bestowed on them the right to retake the Inn without tendering back any 
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consideration. This was during the time when real estate values were escalating rapidly, 
and the Selvigs believed they could resell the property, or perhaps subdivide it, and make 
more money. They had had such discussions with a prospective "investor." R. 1514 at 
204; R. 1515 at 333-34. 
Accordingly, on October 11, 2006, without tendering back any of the consideration 
they had received from Blockbuster, the Selvigs filed their Complaint, seeking a remedy 
which was not available to them under the Parties' agreement nor under any existing legal 
theory. Namely, the Selvigs asserted a right to retake the Inn while retaining all the 
consideration that had already been paid to them or paid on their behalf to their mortgage 
lender, as well as retaining the benefit of all sums expended by Blockbuster to improve 
the Inn. R. 2-26; R. 1515 at 318. In other words, the Selvigs sought to work a forfeiture 
on Blockbuster of the $75,000 cash down payment, plus the $70,000 paid to retire the 
Selvigs' second mortgage, plus about $50,000 in mortgage, tax, and insurance payments, 
plus approximately $300,000 invested in improving and repairing the Inn. 
Admittedly, there had been a breach when Blockbuster failed to retire the Selvigs' 
first mortgage on September 1, 2006, or sometime in October of 2006, depending upon 
the reading of the LPA. However, that breach did not affect the Selvigs in any way 
because Blockbuster continued to make timely payments on the mortgage. R. 1517 
at 874. 
On November 28, 2006, after being served with the Selvigs' Complaint, 
Blockbuster cured its breach by paying off the first mortgage. R. 1501 at ^ 59. 
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The Selvigs have never been able to identify any damages which they suffered as a 
result of Blockbuster's one to three month delay in paying off their first mortgage. R. 
1515 at 353-56, 507-10. 
Blockbuster then sent the Selvigs three letters, stating that the only thing remaining 
to be performed was the construction of the cabin at Duchesne, and offering to move 
forward with that process. R. 102-03, 105, 140-41; R. 1514 at 194-99. The Selvigs did 
not respond to those offers. 
The Parties dispute why the cabin had not been built by the time of the lawsuit. 
The Selvigs had designed a cabin which, they admit, was about three times more 
expensive than the basic cabin described in Addendum 3. The Selvigs claim they never 
started the cabin because Joan Steed was supposed to give them a firm price for the cabin 
they designed, and she never did. R. 1516 at 619-20, 657. 
Blockbuster denies that Highland was responsible for the delay. Joan Steed had 
almost no involvement in the construction end of the business, had no knowledge of the 
pricing of the various cabin components and add-ons, and could not possibly have priced 
the cabin that the Selvigs designed. R. 1518 at 1361-62. Highland Development5s 
construction manager, who designed and priced the cabins, gave the Selvigs a tentative 
price of well over $300,000. R. 1518 at 1361. It was "tentative" because the Selvigs 
believed they could obtain items for the cabin through barter organizations they 
patronized. The Selvigs never determined exactly what they wanted to provide through 
trade. R. 1514 at 283. Furthermore, Mr. Selvig testified that they were allowing 
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Blockbuster additional time to build the cabin, thereby waiving the completion date. R. 
1514 at 284. 
Furthermore, even with the $50,000 construction credit, the Selvigs would have 
been required to obtain a mortgage for about $275,000 for the deluxe cabin they wanted. 
R. 1515 at 359-61. The Selvigs admit they were in no financial position to obtain a large 
mortgage. R. 1515 at 362-63, 521. 
In any event, the Selvigs both testified that, as of October 3, 2006, they had firmly 
and unequivocally renounced any intention to build a cabin in Duchesne. R. 1515 at 366-
67; R. 1516 at 727. 
Regardless of the Selvigs5 renunciation of that contract provision, Highland would 
still build them a cabin on Lot 139, with a $50,000 construction credit, under the Parties5 
agreement. R. 1047. 
Proceedings Below 
After Blockbuster cured its breach by paying off the first mortgage, answered the 
Selvigs5 Complaint, and offered to proceed with building the cabin, the Selvigs did 
nothing until the trial court issued an Order to Show Cause on June 26, 2007. R. 41. 
Blockbuster then filed a Motion to Dismiss, invoking Paragraph 15 of the REPC, 
which required mediation before resorting to other remedies under the REPC. R. 62-63; 
R. 991 at Tj 15 and Addendum A hereto. The Selvigs argued that the REPC did not apply, 
because they were suing for breach of the LPA. R. 93, 98. Blockbuster responded that, if 
only the LPA were applicable, the Selvigs had indisputably received all consideration due 
19 
under that document, and Blockbuster was entitled to summary judgment or dismissal on 
that basis. Blockbuster further pointed out that, with the payment of the first mortgage, 
the only possible performance remaining under the REPC was the construction of the 
cabin, so that the Selvigs could obtain the benefit of their $50,000 credit. R. 121-22. 
The trial court denied Blockbuster's motion, but ordered the Parties to mediation, 
anyway. R. 129. 
Twice more before trial, Blockbuster tried unsuccessfully to focus the Court's 
attention on the invalidity of the Selvigs' primary theory of damages - that they were 
somehow entitled to retake the Inn without tendering back any consideration, because 
Blockbuster had been one to three months late in paying off the Selvigs' first mortgage. 
Also during those pre-trial proceedings, it was expressly made clear that the Court was 
reserving the question of whether and to what extent the REPC survived the signing of 
the LPA was a disputed question reserved for trial. 
On February 8, 2008, the Selvigs moved for summary judgment, claiming again, 
inter alia, that the LPA had been breached and "terminated," but selectively invoking 
provisions of the REPC. R. 169-70, 175. Blockbuster responded that the REPC had 
either been terminated by or replaced by the LPA. R. 235-36. Blockbuster also argued 
that the Selvigs were improperly trying to obtain a rescission of the Parties' agreement 
without tendering back any consideration. R. 234, 236-37, 238, 241. The Selvigs 
responded that they were not seeking rescission of the agreement, but they had terminated 
20 
it, and, to the extent any moneys had been paid by Blockbuster they should be deemed to 
be "renf' for the Inn or be deemed to have been forfeited. R. 258, 268. 
The trial court denied the Selvigs' motion, and specifically held that a disputed 
question of material fact existed as "[t]o what extent [] the terms of the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract survive the execution of the Lease to Purchase Agreement." R. 410 
(emphasis added). This question was never addressed again until the trial. 
On July 1, 2008, Blockbuster moved for partial summary judgment arguing again, 
inter alia, that the Selvigs were not entitled to retake the Inn, and that, if they were 
entitled to anything, it was to money damages. R. 550-52, 559. The Selvigs responded 
that the warranty deed recorded by Mrs. Steed was null and void, that the agreement had 
terminated, and that they were entitled to retake possession of the Inn. R. 713-14, 738. 
The trial court denied summary judgment to Blockbuster on that issue. R. 814-16. 
In their Trial Brief submitted just prior to trial in January, 2009 - for the first time 
- the Selvigs explicitly asked the Court to declare that the REPC and the LPA constituted 
a single agreement. R. 1016-19. 
By this time, the real estate bubble had burst. The Selvigs were still asserting that 
they "terminated" the Parties agreement in October 2006, but they no longer wanted to be 
burdened with the Inn. R. 1515 at 453-54. They conceded that they could not "reinstate" 
the mortgages on the Inn. R. 1514 at 203; R. 1516 at 723. 
So the Selvigs5 prayer for relief became even more far-fetched. They prayed for 
damages consisting of additional amounts the Selvigs might have realized had they 
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retaken the Inn in October of 2006 when values were peaking, and resold it, presumably 
for top dollar. R. 1000-01; R. 1515 at 454. Further, the Selvigs did not want to go to the 
trouble of putting on evidence as to what those highly speculative damages might be, so 
they asked the Court to create the evidence for them by ordering an appraisal, based on 
2006 values, and calculating damages based, apparently, on a hypothetical sale in 2006. 
R. 1000. 
At trial, for the first time, the Selvigs asserted unequivocally, over and over, that 
the REPC and the LP A were a single agreement, and that each and every provision of the 
REPC applied to the case. R. 1514 at 263, 269, 290; R. 1515 at 299; R. 1516 at 604. For 
the first time, the question of "to what extent" the REPC survived was addressed by the 
Selvigs, and for the first time they committed to the position that it applied in its entirety, 
and did so in a fashion that precluded backtracking. 
Also, at trial, Mr. Selvig made a great point of testifying that he had specifically 
relied upon the attorney fee provision, Paragraph 17 of the REPC. R. 1514 at 84; R. 991 
and Addendum A hereto. 
Blockbuster's position at trial was that the REPC no longer governed, that it had 
closed on September 23, 2005, that title had passed, and that any remaining obligations 
under the Parties' agreement were "collateral agreements" to be performed after the 
closing. R. 1073-76. 
At the close of the Selvigs' case, Blockbuster moved for judgment as a matter of 
law on alternative grounds. The first basis for dismissal was that, if the Selvigs' position 
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at trial were correct and the REPC remained in full force, then their action was entirely 
barred because they had failed to tender back the earnest money, as required by Paragraph 
16 of the REPC. R. 1085-86. 
Alternatively, Blockbuster argued that all the damages sought by the Selvigs were 
unavailable as a matter of law, and that the case should be dismissed on that basis. 
Among other things, the Selvigs were not entitled to retake the Inn and work a forfeiture 
on Blockbuster, and all prayers for relief based on that faulty assumption were 
unavailable. R. 1080-85. The Parties' written agreement did not require Blockbuster to 
convey Lot 139 at Utah Mini-Ranches as separate consideration for the contents of the 
Inn, whether or not the Selvigs built a cabin, and any alleged oral agreement to do so was 
barred, either by the Statute of Frauds or by the integration clause of the REPC. R. 1076-
78. And, the Selvigs had renounced any intention to take advantage of the $50,000 
construction credit, and the court was without power to rewrite the Parties' agreement to 
convert a $50,000 "construction credit" to a cash award. R. 1068-69, 1072-73. 
The trial court granted Blockbuster's motion on the first ground, but this Court 
could affirm on the alternative grounds. 
In granting Blockbuster's Motion for Judgment as A Matter of Law, the trial court 
held for the first time that the REPC and the LPA formed a single agreement, and 
awarded attorney fees to Blockbuster under Paragraph 17 of the REPC. R. 1195-96, 
1260. 
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Blockbuster submitted a request for fees in the amount of $ 149,597.50, R. 1273, 
and for costs in the amount of $13,456.90. R. 1225. The Selvigs objected to both 
requests. In response, the trial court did not hold that Blockbusters5 attorneys' rates or 
hours billed were unreasonable. Rather, the court held that - because the Selvigs had 
argued in connection with their motion for summary judgment that the REPC and the 
LPA must be construed together - Blockbuster should have moved for dismissal based on 
the default provision of the REPC at that time. R. 1432-33, 1436-37 and Addendum C 
hereto. The court, therefore, denied all attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with 
the trial, and awarded $ 59,607.50 in attorney fees and $ 2,789.50 in costs. R. 1430 and 
Addendum C hereto. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Most of the Selvigs' assertions of error rest on the false premise that, when 
Blockbuster was late in paying off the first mortgage on the Inn, they had a right to 
"terminate" the agreement, retake the Inn, and work a forfeiture on Blockbuster. They 
had no such right under the contract or the law. Once that false assumption is swept 
aside, little remains. 
If, as the trial court held, the REPC governs this litigation, its default provision 
requires a return of the earnest money deposit before remedies are pursued and it clearly 
applies. This Court has repeatedly affirmed the enforceability and nonwaivability of such 
a provision. This is not a "distinct" case, and there was no "extracontractual" relief 
available to the Selvigs because they had no right to "terminate" the contract. 
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The Selvigs never raised their "quiet title" argument in the trial court, and did not 
bring a "quiet title" claim. But, even if they had, it would make no difference. "Quiet 
title" is a remedy which, in this case, would have been decided under the terms of the 
REPC, if at all. Furthermore, the Selvigs never really explain why calling this a "quiet 
title" action would make a difference. 
The Selvigs are confusing the election of remedies "doctrine" with an express 
contractual provision which limited their remedies and required them to choose between 
retaining the earnest money deposit and pursuing other remedies. This Court has already 
held that these are two distinct concepts, which are not in conflict with each other. 
Furthermore, the Selvigs never raised the election of remedies "doctrine" argument in the 
trial court. 
The Selvigs were not entitled to claim unjust enrichment because this matter was 
controlled by the Parties' written contract. They could not simply "terminate" the 
contract, then claim that everything occurring after that "termination" is an 
extracontractual wrong. Furthermore, the "extracontractual" damages theory is based on 
Blockbuster's possession of the Inn after the alleged "termination," and the Selvigs admit 
they have dropped any claim for possession of the Inn. 
Blockbuster did not waive attorney fees. Blockbuster requested fees before the 
entry of final judgment. Blockbuster was not required to do so sooner. 
On cross-appeal, Blockbuster contends that the trial court was arbitrary in cutting 
off the award of attorney fees and costs, based on the trial court's conclusion that 
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Blockbuster could have raised the REPC's default provision earlier. It was not until trial 
that the Selvigs expressly argued that the REPC and the LPA formed a single agreement, 
and asserted that each provision of the REPC was enforceable. It was only at trial that the 
Selvigs sufficiently committed themselves to that position that they could no longer 
wiggle out of it. Furthermore, the trial court had expressly held that the question of 
whether and to what extent the REPC survived was a disputed issue of fact, to be resolved 
at trial. The trial court arbitrarily shifted the risk of continuing the litigation from the 
Plaintiffs to the Defendants, based on speculation about what the trial court might have 
done if Blockbuster had raised the default provision at some time prior to trial. 
Finally, some of the trial court's "findings" are actually the Selvigs' position on 
matters which were disputed by Blockbuster. It was improper for the trial court to make 
findings of disputed fact before Blockbuster put on its case. None of those facts are 
material to the trial court's decision. But, in the unlikely event that this matter is sent 
back to the trial court on the merits, Blockbuster would not want to be saddled with those 
findings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MOST OF THE SELVIGS' ASSERTIONS OF ERROR REST ON THEIR FALSE 
ASSUMPTION THAT THEY WERE ENTITLED TO RETAKE THE INN AND W O R K A 
FORFEITURE ON BLOCKBUSTER. 
When Blockbuster was one to three months late in making the final payoff of the 
Selvigs' first mortgage, the Selvigs somehow became convinced that they could simply 
walk back in and retake the Inn, work a forfeiture of hundreds of thousands of dollars on 
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Blockbuster, and then - in a booming real estate market - resell or subdivide the property 
at great profit. 
This case has been a welter of confusion ever since, as the Selvigs have thrashed 
about trying to find some legal or contractual support for this insupportable assumption. 
Yet, the Selvigs persist in making this false assumption the centerpiece of their appeal. 
In the Brief of Appellants ("App. Br.55), the Selvigs argue that the matter of 
possession of the Inn is somehow separate from the Parties agreement, and that, "[u]pon 
termination of the REPC, the Selvigs remained the owners of the Inn and were entitled to 
have possession of the Inn returned to them. . . . Defendants should have returned 
possession of the Inn back to the Selvigs and this should have been the end of the matter." 
App. Br. at 19. 
According to the Selvigs, everything that happened after the Selvigs5 alleged 
"termination55 of the Parties5 agreement is extracontractual, and therefore not subject to 
the terms of the contract nor to the law governing unjust enrichment. 
The Selvigs also focus on the recording of the Warranty Deed some 56 days before 
Blockbuster actually finished paying off the debt on the Inn, as if that were somehow 
significant. They seem to believe it interfered with their retaking of the Inn. 
But the recording of the deed is immaterial. The Selvigs had no right to retake the 
Inn, whether Blockbuster held legal title after October 3, 2006, or whether Blockbuster 
merely had a possessory interest and equitable title. See, e.g., C & J Indus, v. Bailey, 618 
P.2d 58, 59 (Utah 1980) (in an executory contract a vendee acquires all of the incidents of 
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ownership except legal title, and is therefore in equity regarded as the owner of property). 
The Selvigs could not simply strip Blockbuster of whatever interest it held in the Inn, 
while retaining the benefit of the cash they had received, the cash that Blockbuster had 
already paid to retire their debt, and the cash that Blockbuster had invested in repairing 
and upgrading the Inn. 
The Selvigs have never pointed to any provision of the REPC or the LPA which 
gives them a right to "terminate" the contract in the event of a breach and work a 
forfeiture. In fact, they admit there is no such provision. R. 1515 at 504. Thus, there was 
no such right. This Court explained the principle in a land sales contract case in which 
the plaintiff seller retained legal title, and the defendant buyer had defaulted on payments: 
The relations between the parties [to the land sales contract] were 
contract relations. It is apparent that these relations might continue 
to exist after breach of the contract by the vendee; the vendor having 
the right to waive the breach, or to forego her remedy therefor. So 
long as the contract relations existed, defendant had the right to 
possession of the premises - was not unlawfully in possession. We 
do not mean to hold that parties to such a contract may not stipulate 
that a specified breach or breaches of the contract shall at once 
determine the contract relations, and work a forfeiture of the 
vendee's rights thereunder. The contract in this case does not so 
stipulate. 
Federal Land Bank of Berkeley v. Sorenson, 101 Utah 305, 309-10, 121 P.2d 398 (Utah 
1942) (quoting Miner v. Dickey, 140 Mich. 518, 103 N.W. 855, 856) (emphasis added). 
From time to time in these proceedings the Selvigs have cited cases in support of 
their claim that they could terminate the Parties' agreement and retake the property 
without returning the consideration they received. However, the Selvigs have overlooked 
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the fact that, in those cases, the seller was enforcing an express contractual right which 
the Selvigs never had. 
On this appeal, for example, the Selvigs cite Engstrom v. Bushnell, 436 P.2d 806 
(Utah 1968) for the proposition that, upon termination of a real estate purchase contract, 
the seller is entitled to take possession of the property and retain an earnest money 
deposit. App. Br. at 24, 32. However, in Engstrom, the terms of the real estate contract 
gave the sellers three alternative remedies, including a "right to declare the contract 
forfeited after notice and failure upon the part of the Engstroms to cure any default or 
defaults in the performance of the contract on their part." Id. at 808. 
Earlier in these proceedings, the Selvigs relied on Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 
(Utah 1983), and Weyher v. Peterson, 399 P.2d 438 (Utah 1965). In Soffe, the seller was 
enforcing "a contractually imposed forfeiture." 659 P.2d at 1083. Likewise, in Weyher, 
the parties' contract contained a provision which provided, 
. . . all payments which have been made theretofore on this contract 
by the buyer, shall be forfeited to the seller as liquidated damages for 
the nonperformance of the contract and the buyer agrees that the 
seller may at his option re-enter and take possession of said premises 
without legal process as its first and former estate, together with all 
improvements and additions made by the buyer thereon . . . . 
399 P.2d at 439. 
There is no such provision in this case. 
And, while it is true that an express, unambiguous forfeiture provision may be 
enforced - within strict equitable limits and according to various court-imposed 
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requirements - the courts will not read such a provision into a contract because "the law 
abhors a forfeiture." Madsen v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1983). 
Instead, "contractual damages are measured by the lost benefit of the bargain, i.e., 
by 'the amount necessary to place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the 
contact had been performed.55' Young Electric Sign Co. v. United Standard West, Inc., 
755 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988) quoting Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 
1982). In addition, "[w]here courts have to choose between conflicting interpretations in 
the agreements under review, an interpretation which will bring about an equitable result 
will be preferred over a harsh or inequitable one.55 First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. 
Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1983). Thus, "general rules of contract construction 
. . . favor interpretations that avoid forfeiture.55 Miller Family Real Estate, LLC. v. Saied 
Hajizadeh, 2008 UT App 475. 
In this case, the Selvigs have received all the consideration for which they 
bargained, except for the $50,000 credit they would have received had they built a cabin 
at Utah Mini-Ranches. They have renounced this performance. See Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 277(2) ("A renunciation by the obligee on his acceptance from 
the obligor of some performance under a contract discharges without consideration a duty 
to pay damages for a breach that gives rise only to a claim for damages for partial breach 
of contract.55). 
Furthermore, even where express termination and forfeiture provisions exist, the 
courts have hemmed them about with equitable restrictions. The result is that - even if 
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the Selvigs had had a contractual right to "terminate" the contract and work a forfeiture, 
which they indisputably did not - the Selvigs would have waived any right to enforce it 
by their conduct. 
Sellers of real estate cannot enforce a termination and forfeiture provision unless it 
is clear and unambiguous, and unless they give a defaulting buyer clear and specific 
notice of their election of the forfeiture remedy and an opportunity to cure. First Security 
Bank of Utah N.A. v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1983); Grow v. MarwickDev., 
Inc., 621 P.2d 1249, 1251-52 (Utah 1980); Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007, 1010 
(Utah 1972); Federal Land Bank of Berkeley v. Sorenson, 121 P.2d 398 (Utah 1942); 
Leone v. Zuniga, 34 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah 1935); Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard, 
936 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849, 852 (Utah 
Ct App. 1987). 
Furthermore, when an obligee declares an obligor in default, he must cease to 
accept performance on the obligation, or he is held to have waived the default. See, e.g., 
Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate andlnv. Co., 279 P.2d 709, 711 (Utahl955) (overruled on 
different grounds) (by receiving money when past due, vendor is precluded from availing 
himself of forfeiture which has arisen because of prior default); McBride v. Stewart, 249 
P. 114, 116 (Utah 1926) (where vendors waived strict compliance by accepting payment 
after they were due, they could not thereafter rescind without notifying purchaser of 
intention and allowing reasonable time for performance); Kohler v. Lundberg, 180 P. 590, 
592 (Utah 1919) (vendor waived right to forfeiture by accepting late payment). 
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The Selvigs never gave clear and unambiguous notice of anything. And they admit 
they gave Blockbuster no opportunity to cure, they just filed suit. Furthermore, when it 
was to the Selvigs' advantage, they continued to treat Blockbuster as the owner of the 
property, and continued to accept benefits under the contract even after they filed this 
lawsuit. They pressed for Blockbuster to spend more money improving the Inn for their 
benefit. They allowed Blockbuster to continue making payments on the first mortgage, 
until the mortgage was paid off. 
Therefore, even if some right to terminate and work a forfeiture had been written 
into the Parties' agreement, the Selvigs could not have asserted it. 
In sum, there is no basis for the Selvigs' assertion that they could "terminate" the 
contract, and all arguments on appeal which rest on this assertion are therefore without 
merit. 
II. IT IS IMMATERIAL THAT T H E SELVIGS ARE NOW CALLING THIS A "QUIET 
TITLE" ACTION. 
The Selvigs never raised their "quiet title" argument in the trial court, and they do 
not really explain why calling this a "quiet title" action should make any substantive 
difference. 
In the first place, "[a] true quiet title action is a suit brought "'to quiet an existing 
title against an adverse or hostile claim of another, and the effect of a decree quieting title 
is not to vest title but rather is to perfect an existing title as against other claimants.'" 
Nolan v. Hoopiiaina, 144 P.3d 1129, 1137 (Utah 2006) (emphasis in original, internal 
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quotations and citations omitted). When the Selvigs filed their Complaint, they conceded 
that title to the Inn had passed to Blockbuster by asking for a reconveyance. 
Furthermore, "quiet title" is a remedy, which can be granted under various legal 
theories, such as adverse possession, or pursuant to the provisions of a contract, as in this 
case. So, the matter comes back to the REPC, upon which the Selvigs relied at trial, and 
which contains the default provision which is fatal to their case. 
As set forth above, the Selvigs could not "terminate" the REPC, and seek 
extracontractual damages, as they attempt to argue here. 
Finally, the Selvigs admit that they dropped any claim to title and possession of the 
Inn by the time of trial. See App. Br. at 20 n.2. 
III. THIS COURT HAS CONFIRMED THE ENFORCEABILITY AND NONWAIVABILITY OF 
THE REPC's DEFAULT PROVISION. 
McKeon v. Crump, 53 P.3d 494 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), is the latest in a line of 
cases, all cited therein, which hold unequivocally (1) that a seller's failure to tender back 
earnest money under a default provision like the one in this case is fatal, (2) that sellers, 
who are given a choice as to their remedies, are held strictly to this provision, and (3) that 
a seller's failure to return the earnest money is not waivable by the buyer. 
In McKeon, the parties' standard real estate contract contained a default provision 
identical in substance to the default provision in the REPC, which stated, "If Buyer 
defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated 
damages, or to return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this contract or pursue other 
remedies available at law." 53 P.3d at 496. 
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The Court of Appeals held that this provision was unambiguous. The court then 
held, '"This clause is for the benefit of the seller. He will obviously always choose the 
option to his advantage and to the disadvantage of the buyer. Under those circumstances 
the clause should be strictly applied against the seller and he should be held to meet its 
requirements with exactness.5'5 Id. (quoting Close v. Blumenthal, 354 P.2d 856, 857 
(I960)). 
The McKeons had failed to tender back the Crumps5 earnest money before filing 
suit. They attempted to deposit the earnest money with the court, after the fact. The court 
held that this was ineffective because the sellers had an "affirmative duty55 to release the 
earnest money before filing suit, and that by failing to do so they had elected their remedy 
- retention of the earnest money as liquidated damages. Id. at 496-97. 
The McKeons then argued that the Crumps had waived this argument by failing to 
plead it. As in this case, the Crumps did not raise the issue until after the close of the 
McKeon5s case at trial. Unlike this case, the Crumps had previously stipulated to waive 
the issue. Id. at 495. But the court reviewed a line of cases where the failure to return 
earnest money had not been pled, and held, 
[0]nce a seller has made his or her election of remedies, that election cannot be 
waived. Therefore, when the McKeons elected to keep the earnest money deposit 
as liquidated damages, the provisions of the default clause were satisfied and could 
not be waived. The McKeons are thereby precluded from pursuing alternative 
remedies. 
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Id at 498. Accord, Dowding v. Land Funding Ltd, 555 P.2d 957 (Utah 1976); Close, 354 
P.2d at 857; McMullin v. Shimmin, 349 P.2d 720 (Utah 1960); Andreasen v. Hansen, 335 
P.2d 404 (Utah 1959); Pa/mer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059 (Utah Ct App. 1995). 
Though these cases did arise from refusals by the defendants to close a real estate 
purchase, the language of their holdings does not limit them to that situation. As a 
practical matter, cases involving these default provisions would usually not arise after a 
scheduled closing date at which a conveyance had taken place, because the real estate 
purchase contract would have merged into the deed, or would have been abrogated by its 
own terms. 
But it is the Selvigs, not Blockbuster, who are responsible for the odd posture of 
this case. It is the Selvigs who continue to insist there has never been a conveyance and 
that the REPC governs the case - at least when it suits them. In fact, by this very 
argument the Selvigs are asserting Blockbuster's alleged "failure to close," thereby 
making this case indistinguishable from the cases already decided by this Court. 
There is no policy reason why the cases governing the operation of the default 
provision would not apply in this case, and no hint in the cases that the courts would or 
should so limit its application. To the contrary, the language of the holdings is very 
broad. 
Furthermore, there is no such limiting language in the default provision of the 
REPC, which applies to any "default" by the buyer, not simply a failure to proceed with 
the purchase. 
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This Court has brushed aside efforts to narrow the application of the rule in 
McKeon and its predecessors. In McMullin, this Court reasoned that the rule applied 
simply because the case "had to do with the sale of real property with an earnest money 
receipt as a vehicle for its consummation." McMullin, 349 P.3d at 720. That certainly 
describes the present case. 
In several of the cases cited above, the seller attempted to distinguish his own case 
from the generally applicable holding. These efforts were rebuffed. See, e.g.,Dowding, 
555 P.2d at 957 (attempts to distinguish case as being one for less than entire contract 
price, or being in equity instead of law were "distinctions without a difference"); Palmer, 
892 P.2d at 1061 (rejecting attempt to distinguish case based on changes in rules of 
escrow). 
The courts have also rejected the argument that the return of earnest money is a 
mere technicality, and that a technical failure to return a relatively small earnest money 
deposit should not be a bar to recovery of much larger damage amounts. In McKeon and 
its predecessors, the liquidated damages amount represented by the unreturned earnest 
money was usually dwarfed by the recovery sought by the seller. See, e.g., Andreasen, at 
377 (dissent complaining that failure to return $50 should not be a bar to recovery of 40 
times that amount). 
But there is nothing "technical" or "unfair" about these holdings. In each case the 
seller had a choice, just as the Selvigs had a choice. The default provision is not a "bar" 
to a larger recovery, as the Selvigs argue. It simply required them to choose. Keep the 
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earnest money, or return it and sue for more. But the choice to keep the earnest money 
precludes suit for alternative remedies, once and for all. 
The Selvigs have cited U.S. General Inc. v. Jenson, 128 P.3 56 (Utah 2005) for 
the proposition that the default provision "does not bar other claims which arguably 'arise 
out of the contract." App. Br. at 30. 
However, the holding in U.S. General explicitly turns upon the fact that the 
contract at issue was an option contract which did not contain the "typical" default 
provision which is contained in the REPC. In fact, U.S. General simply confirms that, in 
this case, where the default provision is contained in the contract, the McKeon rule 
applies, and the trial court was correct to dismiss the case. 
In U.S. General, the Jensons agreed to purchase a lot, made a down payment, and 
agreed to pay certain sums for improvements, interest, taxes and other fees, prior to 
closing. The Jensons made some of the payments but failed to close. The seller, U.S. 
General, sued for unpaid taxes and interest. U.S. General, 128 P.3d at 58-59. 
The parties' agreement contained the following provision, Paragraph J: 
In the event that the buyer does not close on or before January 31, 
2000, buyer agrees to pay interest at a rate of 9 Vi % per annum on 
the unpaid balance . . . starting February 1, 2000 and continuing for a 
period not to exceed May 1, 2002, at that point buyer must close or 
contract is null and void and buyer forfeits all moneys paid. Interest 
only payments will be made quarterly with the first payment due 
May 1,2000. 
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This Court held that this provision created an option to purchase, and specifically 
distinguished that contract from contracts like the REPC, which do contain a default 
provision requiring return of earnest money before suit, stating, 
The Contract in this case appears to be an unusual hybrid of a 
standard real estate contract and an option contract. On the one hand, 
the Contract has elements in common with a standard real estate 
sales contract in that it calls itself a "real estate sales contract"; 
provides for payment of a nonrefundable earnest money deposit; 
designates a date, place, and manner for closing; and contains 
promissory words by both parties, i.e., "Buyer agrees to purchase and 
Seller agrees to s e l l . . . . " 
However, unlike a standard real estate sales contract, the Contract 
does not contain a provision requiring the seller to elect to either 
retain the earnest money deposit as liquidated damages, or return the 
deposit and sue for specific performance of the contract. Cf. McKeon 
v. Crump. 2002 UT App 258, P6, 53 P.3d 494 (clause provides: "If 
Buyer defaults. Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money 
Deposit as liquidated damages, or to return it and sue Buyer to 
specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available 
at law."). Such a provision indicates that the obligations of the 
contract are binding on both parties. 
U.S. General, 128 P.3d at 60 (emphasis added). Because the contract did not contain the 
standard default provision, and because it was an option contract, this Court held that the 
rule in McKeon did not apply and U.S. General's remedies were not limited to the sums 
already collected from the Jensons. Id. at 62. 
Therefore, to the extent U.S. General applies here, it only helps Blockbuster. 
Under the reasoning of U.S. General, because there is a standard default provision in the 
REPC, the rule in McKeon does apply and the Selvig's claims must be dismissed. 
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In support of their "separate and distinct" theory of damages, the Selvigs also cite 
two non-Utah cases which are equally unhelpful. 
First, they cite Short Clove Assoc., Inc. v. liana Realtyy Inc., 154 B.R. 21 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). In that case, the court reasoned that, since courts had the power to 
reduce liquidated damages which bore no relation to actual damages, the courts also had 
the power to increase liquidated damages provisions when they were lower than actual 
damages. Id. at 28 n.3. This reasoning has been soundly and specifically rejected by this 
Court. Andreasen, 335 P.2d at 407-08 
The Selvigs also cite Trapp v. Barley, 897 S.W. 2d 159, 165-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1995). That case turned completely upon contractual language which does not exist in 
this case. Among other things, the liquidated damages provision in Trapp was 
specifically limited to the buyer's failure to close. Id. at 161-62, 166. In this case, the 
default provision applies to any default, not just a failure to close. 
IV. THE SELVIGS' ELECTION OF REMEDIES ARGUMENTS CONFUSE A PROCEDURAL 
"DOCTRINE" WITH A CONTRACTUAL PROVISION. 
The Selvigs never raised the election of remedies "doctrine" before the trial court, 
but it would not have mattered had they done so. 
The Selvigs first argue that the trial court's actions offended the election of 
remedies doctrine as set forth in Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 
778 (Utah 1983), because the Parties' contract had "terminated," and they were seeking 
damages for the extracontractual "wrongs" committed after the "termination." As set 
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forth supra, there is no merit to this argument because the Selvigs never had a right to 
"terminate55 the Parties5 agreement. 
The Court of Appeals has correctly rejected the contention that the default 
provision in the REPC is somehow incompatible with the election of remedies "doctrine. 
In Palmer v. Hayes', the sellers failed to tender back the earnest money deposit under a 
default provision substantively identical to Paragraph 16 of the REPC. The Court of 
Appeals stated: 
The law concerning election of remedies for breach of an Earnest 
Money Security Agreement is clearly stated in a series of supreme 
court decisions beginning with Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 
335 P.2d 404 (1959). 
The [sellers] contend that the holdings in the Andreasen line of cases 
are inconsistent with the election of remedies doctrine defined in 
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 
1983). Angelos defined election of remedies as a 
technical rule of procedure and its purpose is not to 
prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double 
redress for a single wrong. Said doctrine presupposes 
a choice between inconsistent remedies, and 
knowledgeable selection of one there, free of fraud or 
imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy evincing 
a purpose to forego all others. 
671 P.2wd at 778 (quoting Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibraltar Fin. 
Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979) (footnote omitted)). 
Contrary to the [sellers]5 contention, the Andreasen line of cases 
does not conflict with Angelos. The Andreasen line does not dispute 
the fact that election of remedies is a procedural rule; the cases 
simply define the procedure for electing remedies. The cases 
uniformly hold that before a seller may pursue a remedy other than 
liquidated damages, the seller must release any claim to the deposit 
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money. Andreasen, 335 P.2d at 408; Dowding, 555 P.2d at 957; 
Close, 354 P.2d at 857; McMullin, 349 P.2d at 721 
1995 Utah App. LEXIS 20 at 4-6. 
The Selvigs also attempt to apply the election of remedies "doctrine" to argue that 
Blockbuster waived the right to plead this "affirmative defense." 
To the extent the election of remedies "doctrine" even applies here - and that is by 
no means certain, given modem rules permitting alternative and inconsistent pleadings -
demand for an election need not be raised in an answer. Even the citation from Angelos 
in the Selvigs5 brief states that, to the extent it is an affirmative defense, it can be raised 
so as to put the issue before the trial court." App. Br. a 34. 
Furthermore, Blockbuster was not raising an "affirmative defense," it was 
asserting the express terms of the Parties' agreement, once the trial court held that the 
REPC was, unequivocally and completely, part of that agreement. 
Finally, as set forth above, this Court has specifically held that the election of 
remedies contained in default provisions substantively identical to Paragraph 16 of the 
REPC cannot be waived, and can be raised at any time before the trial court. So, even if 
election of remedies "doctrine" were generally applicable here, to the extent it is 
inconsistent with this specific holding, the specific holding would govern. 
V. WHERE THERE WAS A WRITTEN CONTRACT, THE SELVIGS HAVE N O CLAIM 
FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
At trial, the Selvigs put on no evidence that Blockbuster was unjustly enriched. 
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Indeed, Blockbuster had already paid all the out of pocket cash promised for the 
Inn. The $50,000 construction credit was not a hard cost to Blockbuster, it was a 
relinquishment of profits on a cabin which would not otherwise have been built, and was 
a "wash" to Blockbuster. 
On appeal, the Selvigs argue that their unjust enrichment claim is based on 
Blockbuster's continued, and allegedly wrongful, possession of the Inn after the Selvigs 
"terminated" the Parties' agreement. 
As set forth above, the Selvigs did not "terminate" the agreement, and it governs 
this case. Furthermore, the Selvigs admit that they have dropped any claim for possession 
of the Inn, thereby destroying any basis for seeking damages based on Blockbuster's 
continued possession. 
"[Restitution and unjust enrichment are remedies found in quantum meruit. 
Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72, P 10, 167 P.3d 
1080. As tools of equity, they are used only when no express contract is present. Am. 
Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCIMech, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996); see also 
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 268-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (discussing quantum meruit 
as a tool to be used in equity actions)." TruGreen Cos., LLC v. Mower Brothers, 2008 
UT 81, 199 P.3d 929, 933 (Utah 2008). 
Here, the parties had a contract. It had not terminated, and there were no 
"extracontractual" claims. There was no need for an "implied in law" or "implied in fact" 
contract. Furthermore, even if a restitutionary remedy were available, it would have 
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required the Selvigs to restore Blockbuster to the position it occupied prior to the 
contract. In other words, the Selvigs would have had to return much more than the 
earnest money, the Selvigs would have had to return all the consideration they received 
from Blockbuster. 
The Selvigs cannot claim recovery under a theory of quantum meruit, simply 
because they did not like the ultimate result under the contract. 
VI. BLOCKBUSTER DID NOT WAIVE ITS CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES. 
From the first time the Selvigs asserted, early in this litigation, that the LPA and 
not the REPC governed this case, Blockbuster agreed. Blockbuster's position through 
trial was that the REPC had closed with the signing of the LPA, and that the REPC no 
longer governed. Hence, Blockbuster did not seek attorney fees under the REPC. 
At trial, the trial court decided otherwise, held that the REPC completely survived 
the signing of the LPA, and sua sponte awarded attorney fees to Blockbuster under the 
REPC. Blockbuster then submitted its request for attorney fees. 
The Selvigs argue that Blockbuster waived an award of attorney fees because 
Blockbuster did not raise the issue sooner. 
However, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not require defendants to plead for 
specific relief. Only plaintiffs are required to plead for relief. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8. 
Furthermore, as the trial court held, the Selvigs expressly put the attorney fee provision of 
the REPC at issue at trial, by taking the position that the REPC and the LPA constituted a 
single agreement, and that they, themselves, were entitled to attorney fees under a 
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provision which expressly applies to either party. R. 1442; See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) 
(matters tried with consent of parties shall be treated as if pled). 
Furthermore, this Court held in Meadowbrook LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 120 
(Utah 1998), that, previously, "the exact deadline as to when a party must raise a claim to 
attorney fees or be deemed to have waived any claim to such fees [was] subject to 
debate," and that "the time [was] ripe for a clear rule." 959 P.2d at 117, 119. This Court 
then held that "a prevailing party that files a motion for attorney fees before signed entry 
of final judgment or order does not waive its claim to such fees, unless otherwise 
provided by statute or unless it fails to comply with the court's order to address the issue 
at a specific time." Id. at 119-20. 
The Selvigs insist that this holding "presupposes" that the party seeking fees had 
previously raised the issue, but it clearly does not. Meadowbrook states that it settles the 
debate about when such a claim must be "raised." This Court explained that "a party does 
not even become entitled to [attorney's] fees until the [finder of fact] has determined 
which party has prevailed." Id. at 117. That is certainly the case here, where Blockbuster 
was not seeking to enforce the REPC until after the trial court decided that it did, indeed, 
completely survive the Parties' signing of the LP A. 
As the trial court noted, the contrary cases cited by the Selvigs are cases where the 
prevailing party never raised the issue of attorney fees in the trial court, or apparently 
abandoned a claim for fees and then attempted to resurrect it on appeal. R. 1443. 
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In any event, there is no support for the Selvigs' argument that Blockbuster waived 
any right under the Parties5 agreement to attorney fees. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ARBITRARILY CUTTING OFF 
BLOCKBUSTER'S CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO ATTORNEY FEES AND STATUTORY 
RIGHT TO COSTS BEFORE TRIAL. 
This was the Selvigs5 case, brought with full knowledge of the terms of the REPC, 
including the term which resulted in dismissal. However, the trial court arbitrarily shifted 
the cost of going forward to Blockbuster based on speculation that, if Blockbuster had 
raised the default provision earlier, the trial court would have dismissed the case, and a 
conclusion that Blockbuster, therefore, should have done so. 
An arbitrary decision is an abuse of discretion. The trial court's decision is grossly 
unfair and arbitrary for a number of reasons. First, the trial court had specifically 
determined that the question of "to what extent" the REPC even survived the signing of 
the LPA was a disputed issue, reserved for trial. Once that determination was made, 
neither the court nor the Parties squarely addressed the issue again until the trial. 
Second, the Selvigs had a history of cherry-picking provisions from the REPC 
when they were beneficial, arguing that the REPC did not apply when terms were not 
beneficial, and taking the court and the Parties into a number of legal rabbit holes. The 
court had already refused to dismiss once, based on a provision of the REPC which 
required mediation as a precondition to suit. The court had also rejected a motion for 
summary judgment which squarely addressed the Selvigs' overreaching and improper 
theories of recovery, which would have substantially disposed of the case. 
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Third, it was not until trial that the court and the Parties finally took up the issue of 
whether and to what extent the REPC still governed this action. Even more important, it 
was not until trial that the Selvigs committed themselves to the position that each and 
every provision of the REPC was enforceable, and did so in such a way that they could 
not later reverse themselves and try to repackage their theory of the case yet again. 
Based on the history of the proceedings, it is pure speculation that the trial court 
would have dismissed the case any earlier than it did, based on the default provision of 
the REPC. 
And, even if it were true, Blockbuster could not be expected to know it, or to risk 
raising this important issue prematurely, when the Selvigs could simply change their 
theory of the case and forge ahead. The amount of attorney fees awarded should not 
depend on a Party's prescience in guessing which theories will resonate with the court at 
any particular point in time. 
The REPC contains a provision, Paragraph 17, awarding reasonable attorney fees 
to the prevailing party. R. 991 and Addendum A hereto. The trial court improperly 
parsed fees without an adequate contractual or legal basis to do so. A determination made 
on speculation is not a determination of "reasonableness." Yet, based on speculation, the 
trial court denied recovery of the majority of Blockbuster's attorney fees, including all 
attorney fees expended at trial, and denied recovery of over $10,000 expended by 
Blockbuster for trial transcripts. These trial transcripts were used by Blockbuster in 
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briefing its Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, and in extensive post-trial briefing, 
almost all of which was initiated by the Selvigs. 
The denial of costs is particularly galling because, after Blockbuster paid for the 
trial transcripts, the court reporter filed them with the trial court, and the Selvigs thereby 
avoided the cost of ordering a transcript for this appeal. Thus, the trial court effectively 
shifted to Blockbuster what was clearly a cost to be born by the Selvigs.4 
The order of the trial court cutting off attorney fees and costs before trial should be 
reversed, and the trial court should be instructed to determine a reasonable fee award for 
all proceedings below, and to award Blockbuster its full costs. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY MADE FINDINGS OF DISPUTED FACT 
WITHOUT HEARING DEFENDANTS' CASE. 
In ruling on Blockbuster's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, and without 
Blockbuster having put on its case, the trial court made numerous findings of fact, some 
of which were immaterial, disputed, and adverse to Blockbuster. Some findings simply 
adopt the Selvigs' version of events. 
For example, Blockbuster would controvert the Selvigs' version of the parties 
negotiations and conversations, as set forth in the Court's Ruling and Order, Addendum 
D hereto, at Paragraphs 6, 12, 28. Blockbuster disputes that Mrs. Steed offered to give 
the Selvigs lot 139 in exchange for the contents of the Inn, as set forth in Paragraphs 11 
4
 The court reporter eventually refunded $5,000 to Blockbuster because the 
reporter mistakenly filed the transcripts with the court. But, if the Selvigs were properly 
instructed to pay for the trial transcripts, that amount could be returned to the court 
reporter. 
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and 13. Blockbuster disputes the Selvigs' version of events and representations that 
surround the warranty deed, as set forth in Paragraphs 35 and 36. Blockbuster disputes 
that Mrs. Steed asked the Selvigs to return to the Inn as innkeepers, as set forth in 
Paragraph 44. Blockbuster disputes that Mrs. Selvig ever talked to Mrs. Steed about 
getting the first mortgage paid off, as set forth in Paragraph 46. 
Most or all of these findings are immaterial to the Court's ultimate holdings. In 
granting judgment as a matter of law, the trial court's findings should be limited to 
material, ultimate facts supporting the judgment. See, e.g., The Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 
P.2d 1112, 1113 (Utah 1977) ("The law is well settled that it is the duty of the trial judge 
in contested cases to find facts upon all material issues submitted for decision unless 
findings are waived."); Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977) 
("Findings [of fact made in accordance with Rule 52(a)] should be limited to the ultimate 
facts . . . ."); and Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 112 Utah 262, 270, 186 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah 
1947) ("And findings should be limited to the ultimate facts."). 
Moreover, findings in a motion for judgment as a matter of law should be made 
only when facts are undisputed, or when the findings are made based upon admissions 
against a party's interests. Though there is no case law so holding in the specific context 
of motions under Rule 41(b), this rule has been enunciated in other context where 
judgments is made as a matter law, without hearing all the evidence. See, e.g., Crisman v. 
Hallows, 999 P.2d 1249, 1250 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (in ruling on summary judgment, 
determination is made on undisputed material facts); Kenneth J. Majcen & Associates v. 
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The Phoenix Associates, Inc., 2001 Ohio 4121, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 140 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2001) (in granting motion for directed verdict, courts may not determine disputed 
facts in issue); Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. i , 645 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 
1982) (courts may not weigh disputed evidence in context of directed verdict). 
It is logical to extent the rule to judgments made as a matter of law under Rule 
41(b). 
If the trial court is affirmed, these immaterial or disputed findings will have no 
effect. However, in the unlikely event that this matter is returned to the trial court for 
consideration of the merits, Blockbuster would not want to be saddled with these 
findings, and would ask, if such a return were to occur, that the trial court be given 
appropriate instructions regarding these improper findings. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's dismissal of the Selvigs' claims should be affirmed, and the award 
of attorney fees to Blockbuster affirmed. However, on the question of the amount of 
attorney fees, this case should be remanded with instructions to determine an award of 
reasonable attorney fees and necessary costs through trial, and to award fees and costs 
accordingly. 
Also, Blockbuster should be awarded its fees and costs for this appeal. 
49 
DATED this 28th day of October, 2009. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Mary AnnrQ. Wood 
Kathryn O. Balmforth 
Attorneys for Appellees and Cross-Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 28th of October, 2009,1 caused two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS, as well as a 
courtesy electronic copy on CD in searchable PDF format to be mailed in the U.S. Mail, 
first class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Laura S. Scott 
Christina Jepson Schmutz 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 




REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
Ttafc a tegafybirKfr^ contra nhttb*^ 
kt (hetf tnnMdfans vi^ cStnti and customia. P 
S«#k «Mc* tram your tttxnty or ttx «Mcor brio* •oUrinyintoibttdBngcorftict or*«ftttnt<rr 
EARNEST HONEY RECEIPT 
offers to purchase the Property described below and delivers as 
inthe tormof __ check to: Steven W. and Barbara 
a o ihe Brokerage, to be deposited within three business days after Acceptance of this Offer to Purchase by afl parties S e l v i g 
The Buyer J o a n A-
Earnest Money Deposit $ V ifeffc D. 
&Q the Title/Escrow Company identified betow. 
»o8igaiyxooflfl^ p»^oa^a<^ Steven & Steven Receded by. 
(If TitWEscrow Company) for deposit no later than (date). 
n na 
v i g _ 
ra S e l v i g . Address^ 
[ C l o s i n g - S e p t . 3 0 , 
1220 North In t e r i aken r Midway , t 
..(date) Phone Number 8 7 7 - 4 8 4 - 3 5 2 7 
2 0 0 5 h e l d w i t h s e l l e r 
1. PROPERTY 
Address (afcmy** 
1 2 2 0 N o r t h 
2 
QffJSB TO PURCHASE 
Intertaken,Midway,Ut, 84049 ( T h e K a s t l e I n n ) 
-pfty- . County. 
For tegal description, seeJO attached Addendum # J Q pmfimfcwuy atle report wher^ avaBabl&»_™,^ . 
1 t INCLUDED ITEMS: Unless excluded herein, thts sate shaB tociude all fbctures presontiy ittw&kf to 
property shatt also be included in this sale and convoyed under separate B3J of Sate with warranties as to $8e% 
1.2 EXCLUDED HEMS: These Hems are exdudedfrorn this sate ( S e e a t t a c h e d a d d e n d u m ^ ? 
2. PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. Buyer agrees to Day for the Property as Cofiows 
$ 1 0 0 0 ^ 0 0 Earnest Money Deposit 6 / 1 2 / 0 5 ^ 
sUJUM^Otomproceeds: ***see a t t a c h e d addendum*3 ($74 f V 0 / 1 / 0 5 ° Representing the Sabiflty to be assumed by Buyer under an existing assumaoie 
_State_ 
^PPbpikty. The following personal 
.V 
s s u m e "1 s t 0aW%) ** *** approximate amount with D B u ^ O Setter agreeing to pay sj*yk>a« transferal 
? nH M t a b e t w e e n ***** approximate balance of the loan shown above -and the actual balance at Closing shall then be adjusted in O cash 
Mother iflf- ,$564 , -139 ,2nd .$70 y 000«approx .or c u r r e n t ba l ance 10f . t , _ 
D From new mstftubonal financing on terms no less favorable to the Buyer than the following: n a (interest rate tor first 
period prior to ao^ustment, if any); (amortization period), (term). Other than these, the loan terms 
shaB be the best obtainable under the loan (or which the Buyer applies betow. 
Frorp^ eper-hefcf financing, as described in the attached Seller Financing Addendum. 
£afama of Purchase Price in cash at closing A s s u m e m o r t g a g e s o r p a y o f f , $fU* 
9 / 3 Q / Q 5 . Closing shafl occur when: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and defiv-
S 7 ^ Q . n 9 JOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
3. CLOSING. This transaction shall be. dosed on or before 
ered to each other (or to the escrow/title company), all documents required by this Contract by the Lender, by written escrow Instructions signed by the 
Buyer and the SeHer, and by appficabte taw; (b) the moneys required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to the escrow/title 
company tn the form of cotected or cleared funds; and (c) the deed which the Seller has agreed to deliver under Section ©has been recorded. SeBer 
ami BuyWstelf each pay one^ iaJf of the escrow Taxes and assessments tor the current 
year, rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in this Section. AS deposes on tenancies shall be transferred to Buyer at 
Closing. Pftxatons set forth m this Secaonshatbemaoteasof&dateolC^ 
4. POSSESSION. SelershaBdeever possession to Buyerwfthin9/ 3 0 / O S hours after Closing^ f- c l o s i n g -
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At me signing of tWs Contract tr^Usbng Agent _ _ _ J i a represents n Seller 
D Buyer, and the Selling Agent n § represents D Seller D Buyer. Buyer and SeBer confirm that prior to signing this 
Contract written olsclosure of the agency relaikx s^hip was provioed to Nm/herw ( ) Buyer's initials < ) Seller's rnfoaJs. 
e. TITLE TO PROPERTY AMD TITLE INSURANCE, (a) Setter has. or shaB have at C l « ^ free titte to the Property 
to Buyer by 63 general D special warranty deed, free of financial encumbrances as warranted under $ec6on fOd> (b) Seller agrees to j>ay for, and 
furnbh Bayer at Ooelng wkh, a cunejnyaarjiato J o ^ (c) tin* tftft policy 
*hara>nlotmiNimSeitef*cJb^ v ? • " ^ 
Ste insurance oommtanent provided uriSSPSecloWjfr -* ^ V ^ S B P ^ V - . ^ ^ ™ '"£r/sSgpiW5g5»^v-'* 
D The Buyer elects to obtain a full-coverage extended ALTA poScy efffile insurance under 6JjS)T The cost of this coverage, abova that of a 
standard Owner's policy, shall be paid for by the O Buyer O SeBer Also, the cost of a fuft-coverage ALTA survey. shaB be pakf tor by the Q Buyer Q Setter. 
7. SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS OF SELLER AND BUYER. 
7. t SELLER DISCLOSURES. The Sdtof wSf detiver to the Buyer the foUowmg Setter Disclosures no later than the number of calendar days moV 
cated below which shall be days after Acceptance: (days) 
GHa) a SelerftopenyCo/xttto 
Q(b} a cwrmrmiem for the policy c t u ^ 
InciuolfxjcopfesGtfaBdocunwte 
CK(0 a copy of all loan documents ralalirvg 
O(4acorjyofaflteasesandrentk8greem 
Q(e) operating staieniente of the P r o ^ full fiscal years of operation ptos the current fiscal year 
through .certified by the Seller or by an todeperxtem 
Q 9) tenant Estoppel agreements: _____ 
SeBer agrees to pay any charge tor cancelation of the tittooonirrtilmentprovkled unto 
tt Salter does not provide any of the Setter Dlsck*sures-within the time periods agreed above, the Buyer may either waive the particular Salter 
Disclosure requirement by taking no torittV *ction cr the Buyer nuty itotfry the calendar days after the expiration of the 
particular disclosure time period that the Salter is In Default under this Contract and that the remedtes under Section 7$ are at the Buyers disposal 
The holder of the Earnest Money Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, return to the Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit 
without the requirement of further written authorization irorn the SeBer. 
72. BUYER UNDERTAKINGS. The Buyer agrees to: 
i^(a) AppV tor aixvovai of tfte assumption o^  
delivering to the Lender the Wuaf teen application arid doctjrittritatfo 
Lartder(iricltKfng appraisal fee) noisier than 6 0 calendar days after Acceptance; and 
Q(b) Ho later than calendar days after Acceptance, obtain ftomfteLefioVtowtomappica^ 
fa) a written commitment to approve the assurnptiono<theexiftir*gloanor 
Buyers credit worthiness and to normal toan ctoslng procedures; or, A Buytf 
trte sairte tfane frartte. that the proceeds r^ 
These Buyer Undertakings are at Ihe sole expertse of irte Buyer and are rwdenal elements o^  
If Buyer does not initiate any Buyer Undertaking and provide SeBer with written coofrnnatkxi m the time agreed above, the Seller may either 
waive the particular Buyer Uno^taWiig requirement by t ^ ^ calendar days 
of the expiration of the padk^EtjrtoertaKr^ tara perffl 
8.3 tf Buyer objects, Buyer and Setter shaft have n & calendar days after receipt of the objections to resolve Buyers objections, SeBer may, 
out shai not be required to, resolve Buyer's objections. Likewise, the Buyer is under no obligation to accept any resolution proposed by the Seller, tf 
Buyer's objections am not resolved wftfa the staled time, Buyer may void this Contract by providing written notice to Salter within the same stated 
tim. The holder of faa Earnest Money Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit 
without the requirement of any further written authorization from Seller, tf this Contract is not voided by Buyer, Buyer's objection Is deemed to have 
been waived. However, this waiver does not art act warranties under Section 10. 
8.4 Resolution of Buyer's objections under Sector) &3 shall be In writing and shaB become part of this Contract 
9. SPECIAL COrTONGENCHE&Tribr^er Isinade subject to: n a 
The terms of attached Addendum » \ r *-1 ^are Incorporated Into this Contract by this reference. 
10. SELLER'S UMfTED WARRANTIES. SeBeTs warranties to Buyer regard^ the Property are limr^ 
10.1 When Safler delivers possession of the Property to Buyer, tt win be btoonvdean and free of debris and personal belongings; 
10.2 SeBer will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the plumbing, plumbed fixtures, heating, cooling, ventilating, etectnca! and 
sprinkler (indoor and outdoor) systems, appliances, and fireplaces In worWng order, 
10.3Seller*8J deliver possession of the Property to Buyer wrto the roc*arKJfwixlattonfree c< 1 ^ ^ 
10.4 Setter wifl deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with any private wefl or septic tank serving the Property in working order and In 
compliance with governmental regulations; 
105 Seller w$ be responsibte for repairu^ 
\0JB At Closing, Setter wUt bring current afl financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed tn writing by Buyer and wffl 
<fischarge as such obBgafions which Buyer he*rM so assumed; 
. 10.7 As of CkMfo&SeBerhaff no irawleo^ 









'' ^ ' 
11. VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND fcKXUDO) Wll fe , Alter aR contingencies have be*n removed and before Closing, the Buyer may 
conduct* ^ttc-througrf Inspection of the Property to deteiTrtrtt whether or not Hems wa 10.1, 104, W3*r*S 70.4 are in 
the warranted condition and to venfy that terns included in Section ?~f am prosenfy 
will correct, repair or replace it as necessary or, with the consent of Buyer and (4 required) tender, escrow an amount at Closing to provide for such 
repair or replacement The Buyer's faiure to conduct a NiralMhrough"' Inspection or to daim during the >ra!tehrougrf inspection that the Property does 
. not include aM Items referenced in Section f. 1 or is not In me condition warranted in Section 10, shell constitute a waiver of Buyer's rights under Section 
1.1 and of the warranties contained in Section 10. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION, Setter agrees that no changes in any existing leases shaft be made, no new leases entered into, and no 
st^stantial alterations or ^ ripr^^ 
13. AUTHORITY OP SIGNERS. It Buyer or Setter is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person signing this Contract on Its 
behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller and the heirs or successors In interest to Buyer or SeBer. V the Seller is not the 
vested Owner of the Property but has control over the vested Owner's dfeposittonoftrw Property, the Seder agrees to exercise this control and deUver 
title under this Contract as if it had been signed by the vested Owner. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This instrument (together with its Addenda; any attached Exhibits, and Seder Disclosures) constitutes the entire 
Contrect between the parties aixl supersedes a^ 
the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not limited to the disposition of the 
Earnest Money Deposit and the broach or termination of this Contract, shall first be submitted to medtetfon fan accordance with the Utah Real Estate 
Buyer/Seder Mediation flutes of the American Arbitration Association..Each party agrees to bear Its own costs of medration. Any Agreement signed by 
the parties pursuant to the mediation shad be binding, it mediation faJs, the procedures applicable and remedtes available under this Contract shafl 
apply. Nothing in this Section shall prohibit the Buyer from seeking specific performance by tho Setter by Ong a complaint with the court, serving it on 
the Seller by means of summons or as otherwise permitted byiaw, and fecoodtog e ffspe/Mfayt* with regard to the action provided that the Buyer 
pemrts tr>e Seller to refrain from 
16. DEFAULT, tf Buyer defaults, Setter may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as Squidated damages or to fejum the Earnest Money 
Deposit and sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights, tf Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect toermer accept 
from Seller as liquidated damages a sum equal to the Earnest Money Depositor sue SeBer for specSiepem^m^ 
to accept tho fiquidaied damages, SeSer agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. Where a Section of this Contract provides a 
specific rernedy, the parties iruend mat th^ 
17. ATTORNEYS FEES. In any action arising out of this CoirtracL the prevailtog party stttf 
1& OtSPOStTOKJC^^ 
p f a j ) $ $ e ^ Section f 5H (a) does not apply: or (c) court order. 
21. TtttE IS OP THE ESSENCE. Time Is of the essenl^reg^ 
parties. Performance under each Section of mis Contract whicfriwerwra^ PJWL, Mountain Time on the 
72: COUNTERPARTS AND FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS. This Contract titay b e s l g n ^ 
signature shai be considered one document with alt c<r»ers bearing original slg^atuw 
re-transmission of any signed tacsirnBe transmission shall be the same redeir^^ 
.23. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Seder or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other; (a) signs the offer or counteroffer 
where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the c4tier party or the other p a ^ 
required. 
.,24, OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions. If Seler does not accept this 
I j ^ e r b y C J ^ H O W NA . _, mis offer shall lapse; and the bolder of the Earneet Money Deposit shaO 
The°si^^)z^Lr^s pl(dmy^ and seller will confirm and finalize this transaction. 
{Bvyef&4^^V J o a n t A • S t i e d ( ^ Reference Date) ¥. 
Buyer's Name (please prim) 






Setter Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above, 
Steven W,Selvig 6 /12 /05 4 pm 




iww mtaiKMty, <o otsfcnoea tn ine attacnea s>e«ier financing Addendum. 
$fi^4fTi9JB«*«nc«ofPii«frw^ Assume mortgages or pay off. 
$ 1 5 % l 3 9 J0TA1 PURCHASE PRICE ^ ^ * * , ^ ^ 
3. CLOSING. This transaction shall be, dosed on or before 9 / 3 0 / 0 5 . doting shaB occur when: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and deliv-
ered to each rjther(cr to the escrow/^ 
Buyer and the Setter, and by applicable law; (b) the moneys required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to the escrow/titte 
company in the form of coBected or cleared funds; and (c) the deed which the SeBer has agreed to defiver under Section 6 has been recorded. Seller 
and Buyer shaft each pay one-half of the escrow Closing fee, unless otherwise agreed by the parties in writing. Taxes and assessments for the current 
year, rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth m this Section. AB deposits on tenancies shal be transferred to Buyer at 
Ctosir^ Prorations a* torth in trJsSeca^ 
4. POSSESSION. Seller sr^q^verpcesession to Buyer within 9 / 3 0 / Q r S hours after Closing^ t c l o s i n g 
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract the listing Agent n a represents D Seller 
D Buyer, and the Setting Agent n a represents D SeBer D Buyer. Buyer and Setter confirm that prior to signing this 
Contract written dfectosum of the agency relationship was provkied to ritm/herv ( ) Buyer's initials ( ) Setter's initials. 
6. TITLE TO PROPERTY AND TITLE INSURANCE, (a) Setter has, or shall have at Closing, free trie to the Property and agrees to convey such We 
to Buyer by &J general D special warranty deed, free of financial encumbrances as warranted under Section 10.&, (b) SeBer agrees to pay for, and 
furnish Buyer at Closing with, a current standard form Owner's policy of trie insurance in the amount of the Total Purchase Price; (c) the title policy 
shaU coo*ocn> wto Safins obBpalk)^ 
title insurance commitment provided under Section 7J 
Q The Buyer elects to obtain a full-coverage extended ALTA poficy of title insurance under 6(b). The cost of this coverage, above thai of a 
standard Owner's rjoticy.shafl be paki forty 
7. SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS OF SELLER AND BUYER. 
7.1 SELLER DISCLOSURES. The Setter wifl defiver to the Buyer the following Setter Disclosures no later than the number of calendar days indV 
cated below which shall be days after Acceptance: (days) 
Qt(a) a Seiler Property Ctonctt^ Ofe^bst^ for Ihe Property, s" 
Ovtyaccrnrratrnertfcf t h e p d ^ 
inducing copies of att documents Isted as Exceptkra on the Corrimitnient 
CX(c) a copy of afl toan documents relating to any loan now existing wNcfcwaericuniber trie Prope 
D(d) a copy ofafl leases and rental agreements now In effect wimreg^ to the Property together wto^ 
Die) operating statements of the Property for ttslast fuB fiscal years of operation plus the current fiscal year 
through .certified by the SeBer or by an independent audrtoc 
D 0) tenant Estoppel agreements' 
Seller agrees to pay any charge feorcancettation of the Hie commitment proviM under subsection (ty. 
If Seiler does not provide any of the Setter Disclosures-within the time periods agreed above, the Buyer may either waive the parbcuUr Setter 
Disclosure tequirerrtent by ta>jng no bme*y action or the Buyer may notify the SeBer in writing wttWn calender days after the expiration of the 
particular disclosure time period that the Setter is in Default under this Contract and that the ferneries under Section 16 are at the Buyer's disposal 
The holder of the Earnest Money Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, return to the Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit 
without the requirement of further written authorization from the SeBer. 
72 BUYER UNDERTAKINGS. The Buyer agrees to: 
&{a)Ar^ for approval of Itoassurrtptiontt 
deflvering to the Lender the initial loan appficaJionanddccuiiieritaito 
Lender (mctuoing appraisal tee) no later than 6 0 , calendar days after Acceptance; and 
0(b) No later than calendar days after Acceptance, obtain from ttie Lender to wtomapptcation is n»ate 
(a) a written commitment to approve the assun?tocf the existing loan or to furtf 
Buyer's credit worthiness and to normal loan c l o ^ 
the sarne Brne frame, that trie rjroceeds reo^ed 
These Buyer Undertakings are at the aote expense of ttw Buyer arxl am material elements cf this Contracts 
If Buyer does not initiate any Buyer Undertaking and provide SeBer wfth written confirmation in the time agreed above, the Setter may either 
waive the particular Buyer Undertaking requirement by taking no timely action or the Setter may notify the Buyer in writing within calendar days 
of the expiration of the particular undertaking time period that the Buyer is "nDetautt under tr^Con^ 
trie Sefter**<isposaL Trie rwtdercrf the Ea 
Money Deposit without the requirement of further written autricxizalton bom to 
7.3 ADDITIONAL DUE DILIGENCE. The Buyer shaB iindertake the foBowirig AddMond 
own benefit for the purpose of complying wfth the Conttoosnciss under S**fcn& - (AwIrJJwfl'2Jt±i 
a (a) OidertrigarxSobtamirKj an operate S^yW *1T ^ ? ? , 
Ofb) Ordering and obtaining a survey of the Property ff c>ne is riot otherwise teouired und* M S e l J L e r W i l l p r o v i d e 
D(c)C*dering aid obtaining any envirow^^ * p u r c h a s e r w i t h l a s t a p p r 
0(d)<>rc«ringandcWajr^a# I S d 
D (e) Requesting and obtaining verification that the Property complies with all-applicable federal, state, and local laws, ordinances, and 
refutations with regard to zoning and pemiisstfe tise of fre Property. 
Seller agrees to cooperate fuBy with Buyer's completing these Due DtBgef« matters aM 
for the same. 
a. CONTINGENCIES. This offer is subject to the Buyer's ajjproving in Its sole discretion the SeUsr Disclosures, the Buyer Undertakings, and 
Additions* Due DfSgence matters in Sedfc* 7. However, the Buyer's dte 
Buyer's coveriartwim regard to mintmafy 
8.1 Buyer shaB have _ n a _ calendar days after tr» times spedfted fo Sactxv? 7J arc* 7J2ta 
of Btiyer UridsYteldng* to review tfie oonterB 
7.2 appBes for completing a review of Addttloiiaf Due D41genes matters urtte 
%Z U 8uyer does not deliver a written objection to Sefto rep i^txr^ a Seller Disckwure, Buyer u 
time provided in Section 8.1. that item wfll be deemed approved by Buyer, 
Page! of2 
ta. t/tar-uie ms*n_uifUN. rne parties agree mat any dispute or daun relating to this Contract, incKKtag but not fcmited to the cjsposition of the 
Earnest Money Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract shall first be submrtted to roecSa&on m accordance with the Utah Real Estate 
Buyer/Setter Mediation Rules of the American Afbttratiw As$a»tK>n. Each pany agrees to bear fts own c c ^ 
the parties pursuant to the mediation shall be binding, K medatJon falls, the procedures appScabte and reroecfies avaaabfe under this Contract shall 
apply. Nothing In this Section shall prohibit the Buyer frcro seeking specific perfo^ 
the Seter by means of summons or as otherwise permitted by law, and recocding a Us pandmm with regard to the action provided that the Buyer 
permits the Seller to refrain from answering the complaint pending metfattofY Also, the parties may agree In writing to waive mediation 
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults. Setter may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the Earnest Monty 
Deposit and sue Buyer to enforce Salter's rights If Seller defaults, m addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect to etther accept 
from Seller as liquidated damages a sum equal to the Earnest Ilorwy Deposit c* sue Sefier for spec^ 
to accept the fiqukfeted damages, SeSer agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. Where a Section of this Contract provides a 
specific remedy, the partes intend that the mmeoy sttafi be exclusive regardless of rigto 
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any action ansmg out of this Contract the pfevaffir$ party shaH be entitled to costs a ^ 
18. DISPOsmON OF EARNEST MONEY. The Earnest Money Deposit shaft nc* be released unle^ ft ^  
(b)septtata written agreernsttt of tr» parties 
19. ABROGATION, feoffor express wajrajitfesmafe^ 
20. RISK OF LOSS. AM nek ot toss or carnage to the Pr~p*rty Than he hyrtaj^Setter uQtf! Closing. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time Is of the essence regarding the dates set tortrt totf f trra 
parties. Performance under each Section of this Contract which references a date shall be required absolutely by 5:00 PJUL, Mountain Time on the 
stated date. 
22. COUNTERPARTS AND FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMEKTS. This Contract may be sigried in counterparts, and each c o ^ 
signature shal be considered one document wtth afl others bearing original signature. Also, facsimile transmission of any signed onojnat document and 
re-transmission of any signed facsimile transmbskxi5haIibethesanieasc«fi\^crfanon^inaL 
23. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when SeSer or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other, (a) signs the otter or counteroffer 
where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) commurrfcalestotteotfierparlyortte 
required. 
\24. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and condttons. rf Seler does not accept this 
lofferbyQJuXQPM Mountain Tinia, N A . , mis offer Shan lapse; and the holder of the Eameetlloney Deposit shaft 
Will confirm and 
6/1Z/05 
finalize this transaction 
Buyer's Name (please print) 
P . O . Box 3 5 8 . Duchesne , U t . 8 4 0 21 
(Notice Address) 




Setter Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and coodtocm specified above. 
Steven W>Selvig 6 / 1 2 / 0 5 4 pin 
(Setter's Signature) 
ease print) v 3 
Barbara D, Selvig 
(Date) 
6 / 1 2 / 0 5 
(Time) 
SeUer*s Name (ple s r. 
1220 North Interlaken.Midway.UT.84049 
(Notice Address) (Phone) 
D Rejection: Seter Refects the foregoing offer. 
n a (Setter's initials) n a (Date) n a '. .(Tune) 
O Counter Often Seder presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or modifications as specified in the 
attached Counter Offer # 
DOCUMENT RECBPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Sefer wimcapiescf WsCortracioean^ 
fore be completed). 
A. D I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregp^ Contract bearirigaJl signatures: 
SIGNATURE OF SELLER SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
Date 
a D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing contract bean^afisignatijres to be mao^d on 
by certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the Q Setter Q Buyer, Sent by 
Date 
- 1 9 -
SeHer*s Initials ( )Datft„ Buyer's Initials ( )Dat». 
P«9o2o(2 
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PLAT MAP 
Borrower Selvig.Steven & Barbara File No. 98027386 
Property Address 1220NorthlntertekenD Case No SeJvtg/Ordef#98027386 
City Midway State Utah Ztp- 84049 
Lender ChaseManhattan Bank. 
OCT-19-2004 TUE 03:12 Pll FIRST AHERICAN TITLE FAX NO. 435 654 1422 P. 05 
'i/4 SECTION 26, T3S, R. 4E SLM ™u 
" ^ Wi:/«s _ 
G/^ ^ 
^ t | ? > \ AVOAa^VM^ i 
WarrantyDeed 
Borrower Selvig Steven & Barbara ** File No 98027386 
Prpperw Address 1220NorthintertakeriD 
City Midway State Utah 
Case No Setv>g/Ofder#98027386 
Ztp 84049 
Lender ChaseManhatlan Bank 
t-t#~*vt# ut o^>..^ ri tuG> HntJC-^ti* tiLfc 
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ADDENDUM #2. to real estate contract signed 6/12/05 for purchase of: 
1220 North Interlaken,Midway, Ut. 84049 (The Kastle Inn) 
THE MAJORITY OF ITEMS SEEN BY BUYER ON JUNE 9,2005 WILL BE 
APART OF THIS TRANSACTION WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE ITEMS 
BARBARA SELVIG POINTED OUT TO BUYER-
THERE WILL BE SEVERAL PERSONAL ITEMS WHICH WILL BE 
MUTUALLY AGREED UPON BY BUYER AND SELLER ON OR BEFORE 
JUNE 19,2005. 
P^oan A. Steed (Buyer) date 
/ - ^ i 
Steven W. Selvig (Seller) date 
Barbara D. Selvig (Seller)0 date 
Ci*—>*— 
ADDENDUM #3. to real estate contract signed 6/12/05 for purchase of: 
1220 North Interlaken, Midway, Ut 84049 (The Kastle Inn) 
Buyer will put $75,000. cash down on this purchase, $1000.00 6/12/05 and $74,000. 
at closing 9/30/05 and will credit $50,000.00 in construction cost to build a home for 
Steven W. Selvig and Barbara D, Selvig. Total true value of down payment 
$125,000.00. Buyer will assume first and second mortgage, which will be current at 
time of closing. If there is a problem with assumption, buyer will pay existing loans 
off at time of closing. Seller will pay mortgage payment for July, August and 
September, 2005 on both mortgages. Insurance will be prorated. 
Highland Development, Inc. will design and build a 28 x 44 ft. cabin, 6/12 pitch 
completely finished with 2 bedrooms, 1- full bath, carpet/vinyl, heating system, loft 
and other items which come with this house package which will include Lot # 139, a 
prime view lot at no extra charge, located in Utah Mini Ranches Subdivision in 
Duchesne, Utah. 8402 L 
The minimum cost value for the 28ft. by 44ft. house with lot 139 without any extras, 
will be $109,950. The minimum cost for a two car garage, 24ft. x 28ft., with two 
windows, electric door and concrete pad will be $18,000. 
The additional cost for power tap, water tap, and installation of a septic tank system 
will be $9800.00. 
The seller may exceed theses costs with upgrades and additions mutually agreed upon 
during the finalization of the floorplan which will take place on or before 
Sept 1,2005. 
Seller will allow construction start to take place on or before February 1,2006. 
lifghland DeAJcelopment, Inc. date Steven W. Selvig date 
arbara D. Selvig 
TabB 
Lease to Purchase Agreement 
Blockbuster Enterprises, L.C, (Buyer) a limited liability companj organized 
and existing under the laws of the state of Utah, agrees to lease to purchase the 
Kastle Inn located at 1220 Interlaken Dr., Midway, Ut. from Si even W Selvig and 
Barbara D. Selvig, (Seller) for a period of 12 months. Buyer will assume Seller's 
monthly payments in the amount of $3521.90 on the first mortgage am a payrrent 
of $491.33 on the second mortgage. Both payments coming due on the first of iach 
and every month. The first payment beginning October 1,2005. On the 13th 
month, September 1, 2006, Buyer agrees to pay off the balances owed on both 
mortgages. Seller agrees to bring all taxes and insurances current. Buyer will be 
responsible for taxes and insurances October 1,2005. Buyer will be responsible for 
any lates fees which may occur daring this 12 month period.73.s fc*ee/n<n*i t float 
\jQ<s^Jb(7Hf <f<maA fiflz or^/v ^ ^ -fa f)nrr+ W<fui> . * * A * ^ *"• 
Total purchase price $759,139.00 
{v^M^^By 
Blockbuster Enterprises, L.C. 
loan A. Steed 
State of Utah
 t /!03b& *&¥ B^S "J 
lw2s£m»n COMNIISWEAT 
County of Wasatch i^&z^xv tyt****^*,
 f 
On this 1Q day of ^ prt lh \yiK 2005, personalty appeared before me, Joan 
A. Steed, known to me to be die member or designated agent of the liability 
company, Blockbuster Enterprises, L.C, that executed this instrument and 
acknowledged the same to be the free and voluntary act and deed of the limited 
liability company, by authority of statute, it's articles of organization or it's 
operating agreement, for the uses and purposes therein mentioned and on oath 
stated that they are authorized to execute this instrument and in fact executed tins 
instrument on behalf of limited liability company. 
W( kl I /)VJL^ My Commission Expires: ^ / / v / / ^ 
Notary Public l / ! ' 
TabC 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




BLOCKBUSTER ENTERPRISES, LC, 
HIGHLAND DEVELOPMENT, INC., and 
JOAN A. STEED, 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER: 
(1) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS; 
(2) DEFENDANTS' REQUEST 
FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES; AND 
(3) PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
Case No. 060500324 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
This matter came before the Court for bench trial After Plaintiffs Steven W. Selvig and Barbara 
D. Selvig ("the Selvigs") rested, Defendants Blockbuster Enterprises, LC, Highland Development, Inc. 
and Joan Steed (collectively "the Defendants") moved for involuntary dismissal. 
On February 20, 2009, the Court issued its written Ruling and Order granting Defendants' 
motion for involuntary dismissal. That Ruling and Order included the following provision: 
1 
In any action arising out of the REPC, the "prevailing party shall be 
entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees." (Exhibit 1,^17). The 
Selvigs civil action arose out of the REPC, as amended by the Lease to 
Purchase Agreement. As the prevailing party, Defendants are entitled to 
an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
(Ruling, 2/20/09, p. 18). 
On March 6, 2009, acting pursuant to the Court's Ruling and Order, the Defendants filed a 
Request for Attorney's Fees and supporting affidavit. The Defendants seek an award of attorney's fees 
in the amount of $149,597.50. The Selvigs filed an Objection To Defendants' Request for Attorney's 
Fees on March 18, 2009. The Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum on March 30, 2009. 
On March 6, 2009, the Selvigs filed their Motion to Reconsider Award of Attorney's Fees And 
Costs To Defendants. The Defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition on March 23, 2009. The 
Selvigs filed a Reply Memorandum on March 31, 2009. 
On February 26, 2009, the Defendants filed a Memorandum of Costs. The Defendants seek an 
award of costs in the amount of $13,456.90. The Selvigs filed an Objection to Defendants' 
Memorandum of Costs on March 6, 2009. The Defendants filed their Opposition To Plaintiffs' 
Objection To Defendants' Memorandum Of Costs on March 23, 2009. 
The motion to reconsider, request for attorney's fees, and objection to costs are now fully briefed 
and ready for decision. 
2 
RULING 
The Selvigs' Motion to Reconsider Award of Attorney's Fees1 
The Defendants Did Not Waive Their Right to Attorney's Fees 
The Selvigs argue that the Defendants waived any right to attorney's fees by not raising the issue 
in their answer or their motion for involuntary dismissal. For this proposition, the Selvigs cite Phelps v. 
Sanders Trust, 1999 WL33244757, an unpublished memorandum decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The Selvigs acknowledge the general rule—that a prevailing party may move for attorney's fees at any 
time prior to the entry of final judgment—but assert that this rule "presumes that the prevailing party 
actually requested attorney's fees in some relevant pleading/' (Selvig Mot. To Reconsider, p. 4). 
The Defendant's argue that the right to attorney's fees is not waived until a final judgment enters. 
Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah 1998). The Defendants distinguish Phelps 
arguing that the case addresses a plaintiffs failure to plead for attorney's fees. The Defendants argue 
that "Utah rules impose different pleading requirements on . . . defendants." (Defendants' Opp. Memo., 
p 1). Finally, the Defendants contend that when the Selvigs asserted the binding nature of the REPC at 
trial, they expressly consented to trial of the attorney's fees issue, whether raised in the Defendants' 
pleadings or not. Utah R. Civ. P. 15. 
lIn this Motion, the Selvigs also argue that the Court should limit any award of attorney's 
fees to those incurred prior to August 7, 2007, the date the Defendants filed their motion to 
dismiss. This issue is also raised in the Selvigs' Objection To The Defendants' Request for 
Attorney's Fees. Because the question goes to the amount of attorney's fees, rather than the 
Defendants' legal right to an award, the Court will address the question in the context of the 
Selvigs' Objection. 
3 
Prior to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Meadowbrook, "the exact deadline as to when a 
party must raise a claim to attorney fees or be deemed to have waived any claim to such fees [was] 
subject to debate." Meadowbrook, 959 P.2d at 117. Deciding that the "time [was] ripe for a clear rule," 
the Court resolved that debate—"a prevailing party that files a motion for attorney fees before signed 
entry of final judgment or order does not waive its claim to such fees, unless otherwise provided by 
statute or unless it fails to comply with the court's order to address the issue at a specific time." Id., 959 
P.2d at 119-20. 
This bright line rule promotes judicial economy because "a party does not even become entitled 
to [attorney's] fees until the [finder of fact] has determined which party has prevailed." Id., 959 P.2d at 
117. Moreover, "the issue of attorney fees is generally ancillary to the underlying action . . . [and] 
normally requires an inquiry separate from the main cause of action to be proved at trial." Id., 959 P.2d 
at 117-118. 
The Court is not persuaded that Phelps sets forth a broader rule than that articulated in 
Meadowbrook. In Phelps, the plaintiff "did not raise the issue of attorney fees under the contract either 
in his complaint or motion for summary judgment." Presumably, he did not raise the issue in a post-trial 
motion before entry of final judgment either. In support of its ruling that the plaintiff had "waived his 
right to attorney fees below," the Court cited Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App 126, 977 P.2d 550. In Lee, 
the defendants had requested attorney fees in their answer and motion for summary judgment. However, 
the defendants did not mention the issue at oral argument, and the order of dismissal "prepared by 
[defendants'] attorney, [did] not include a fee award." Id. at % 13. 
4 
In this case, the Selvigs took the position that the REPC (which contained the attorney's fee 
provision) and the Lease to Purchase Agreement constituted one contract. The Court agreed. See, 
Ruling and Order, p. 13 ("The Court agrees with the analysis set forth in Part LA of the Selvigs' Trial 
Brief The REPC and the Lease to Purchase Agreement form a single agreement for the purchase of the 
Inn). At trial, the Selvigs sought an award of attorney's fees as provided for under the REPC. REPC, % 
17 (in any action arising out of the REPC, the "prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees"). 
The Court is not persuaded that the Defendants waived their right to claim attorney's fees as the 
prevailing party. The Defendants did not become entitled to attorney's fees until after the Court 
determined them to be the prevailing party. By arguing that the REPC—including its attorney's fees 
provision—was binding upon the parties and that they themselves were entitled to an award of fees, the 
Selvigs expressly consented to the trial of this issue. The Defendants' request for attorney's fees was 
made before entry of final judgment and is therefore timely. 
Termination of The REPC and Lease To Purchase Agreement Would Not Have 
Extinguished The Defendants' Right To Recover Attorney's Fees 
The Selvigs argue that they terminated the REPC and Lease to Purchase Agreement on October 
3, 2006 due to the Defendants' failure to pay off the first mortgage. The Selvigs contend that because 
they were not in default on that date—and the Defendants were—the Defendants are not entitled to 
recover attorney's fees. For this proposition, the Selvigs rely on Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 
2009 UT 2. Tl 77; Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); and Maynard v. Wharton, 912 
P.2d 446 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
5 
The Defendants argue that Giusti, Fisher, and Maynard are distinguishable because in each of 
those cases the attorney's fees provision at issue applied only to the defaulting party. The REPC in this 
action reads: "In any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees." (REPC, % 17). 
The Defendants take issue with the assertion that the REPC and Lease to Purchase Agreement 
terminated on October 3, 2006, there being no judicial finding to that effect. However, even if 
termination did occur, the attorney's fees provision continued to be binding on the parties. For this 
proposition, the Defendants rely on IHC Health Services v. D&K Management, 196 P.3d 588, 599 (Utah 
2008). 
The Court agrees with the Defendants. The Court has never made a finding as to whether the 
REPC and Lease to Purchase Agreement were terminated, or when. IHC Health Services sets forth the 
general rule that "provisions for attorney fees continue to be binding on the parties even though the term 
of the lease has ended." Id., 2008 UT 73, ^  39. This ruling might be read narrowly to apply to the hold-
over tenant scenario presented. However, the underlying principle is sound. 
Contract litigation rarely concludes during the term of the contract itself. Often the prevailing 
party is not judicially determined for months or even years after the parties have parted company. An 
attorney's fee provision in a contract is evidence that the parties contemplated litigation as we know it, 
and expressly allocated risk accordingly. To rule that attorney's fees provisions terminate upon the 
occurrence of a material breach would undermine the very purpose for which such provisions exist. 
For these reasons, the Court concludes that even if termination did occur as argued by the 
Selvigs, the Defendants' contractual right to recover attorney's fees under the REPC was not 
6 
extinguished. Indeed, the Selvigs conceded as much at trial, arguing that they themselves would be 
entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to the terms of the REPC if they prevailed in the action. 
Finally, Giusti, Fisher, and Maynard all involved contract provisions entitling the non-defaulting 
party to an award of attorney's fees. "In Utah, attorney fees authorized by contract are awardable only in 
accordance with the explicit terms of the contract and only to the extent permitted by the contract." 
Maynard, 912 P.2d at 452, citing, Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 
671 (Utah 1982); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Utah App. 1989). 
Accordingly, the courts in Giusti, Fisher, and Maynard required proof that the party seeking fees was not 
in default as a prerequisite to an award. These three cases do not stand for the broader proposition 
argued by the Selvigs. 
The Selvigs' Objection To The Defendants' 
Request for Attorney's Fees 
The Selvigs argue that the Court should limit "any award of attorney's fees and costs to those 
incurred prior to August 7, 2007, the date the Defendants filed their motion to dismiss based on the 
alternative dispute resolution provision of the REPC." (Selvigs' Objection, p. 2). The Selvigs contend 
that the Defendants—who asserted then that the REPC was binding upon the parties—could also have 
moved for dismissal based upon the election of remedies clause. Instead, the Defendants waited until 
halfway through trial to raise the issue. In the alternative, the Selvigs question whether some of the fees 
sought were reasonable and necessary. (Selvigs' Objection, pp. 3-11). 
The Defendants assert that in responding to the Defendants' first motion to dismiss, the Selvigs 
took the position that the REPC did not govern this action. (Selvigs' Memo. In Opp. To Motion To 
7 
Dismiss, 8/20/07, at 2,7). The Defendants contend that "it was only at trial—when the Selvigs finally, 
irrevocably committed to the position that each and every provision of the REPC was enforceable—that 
dismissal [under the election of remedies provision in the REPC] became inevitable." (Def. Reply To 
Plaintiffs' Obj., 3/30/09, at 5). The Defendants assert that the Selvigs' failed to consider the election of 
remedies provision in the REPC before filing suit, and prosecuted their claims to trial notwithstanding. 
The Defendants incurred significant attorney's fees as a result, and are contractually entitled to recover 
them. 
The court record demonstrates that both the Selvigs and the Defendants vacillated as to whether 
the REPC remained in force. The Selvigs' complaint plead breach of contract based upon both the 
REPC and the Lease to Purchase Agreement. (Complaint, pp. 2-4). Defendants moved to dismiss on 
the ground that the REPC's mediation provision was binding on the parties. (Def. Memo. In Supp. Of 
Motion To Dismiss, pp. 1-3). The Selvigs responded, arguing that "the Lease-Purchase Agreement is 
the agreement that was breached by Defendants when they failed to close the transaction on September 
1, 2006 and when they improperly recorded the Warranty Deed." (Selvigs' Memo. In Opp. To Motion 
To Dismiss, filed 8/21/07, pp. 2, 7). 
In February 2008, the Selvigs moved for summary judgment. Their supporting memorandum set 
forth the terms of both the REPC and the Lease to Purchase Agreement. (Selvigs' Memo. In Supp., filed 
2/11/08, pp. 1-7). The Selvigs argued that "time was of the essence" under the parties' contract—a 
provision which appears only in the REPC. Id., at pp. 7-8. In response, the Defendants argued that the 
REPC "ceased to be in effect on September 30, 2005, either because it failed to close or because it had 
been replaced by the Lease to Purchase Agreement." (Def Memo. In Opp., filed 2/29/08, p. 4). The 
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Selvigs responded, arguing that the REPC and Lease to Purchase Agreement must be construed together 
to determine the rights of the parties. (Selvigs' Reply Memo, filed 3/12/08, pp. ii, 3). 
At the time the Defendants opposed the Selvigs' Motion for Summary Judgment, they were 
aware of the election of remedies clause in the REPC as a defense to the Selvigs' claims. The 
Defendants wrote: 
Additionally, even if Plaintiffs could establish that time was of the essence 
under the Lease to Purchase Agreement, they still would not be entitled to 
rescind the Agreement because they have never attempted to tender back 
the $1,000.00 earnest money deposit or the $74,000.00 down payment to 
Defendants. 
(Def. Memo. In Opp., filed 2/29/08, at p. 5). 
The Court denied the Selvigs' Motion For Summary Judgment because disputed issues of 
material fact persisted. One such fact was: "To what extent do the terms of the [REPC] survive the 
Lease to Purchase Agreement." (Order, dated 6/18/08). 
In July 2008, the Defendants moved for summary judgment as to the availability of certain 
remedies sought by the Selvigs. In doing so, the Defendants argued that if the REPC and its addenda 
were enforceable, then the Selvigs were entitled to a $50,000.00 construction credit only, not to the 
transfer of Lot 139 as well. (Def. Memo. In Supp., filed 7/1/08, pp. 7-8). In the Selvigs' opposition 
memoranda, the distinction between the REPC and the Lease to Purchase Agreement is abandoned. The 
Selvigs simply refer to "the purchase agreement" or "the purchase contract." (Selvigs' Memo. In. Opp., 
filed, pp. 26,28-31,33). 
At oral argument, counsel for the Selvigs confirmed this position, stating that the REPC and the 
Lease to Purchase Agreement, "these two documents together become the contract for this case." (Oct. 
9 
3, 2008 Hearing Transcript, 10/3/08. pp. 34, 38). Counsel for the Defendants argued that the Lease to 
Purchase Agreement was an "intervening agreement" that changed the original transaction. Id., at p. 11. 
Although counsel for Defendants conceded that "some of the provisions [of the REPC] carried over." 
Id. 
This record demonstrates that by February 2008, the Selvigs' theory of the case was clear—the 
REPC and the Lease to Purchase Agreement must be construed together as one contract to determine the 
rights of the parties. Accepting this theory as true, the Defendants would have been entitled to summary 
judgment under the election of remedies provision in the REPC. By February 2008, Defendants were 
aware of the election of remedies provision as a possible defense and even made reference to it. 
Thereafter, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to define what remedies were 
available to the Selvigs as a matter of law. The election of remedies clause eliminated any remedy for 
the Selvigs. 
"Reasonable attorneys fees are not measured by what an attorney actually bills, nor is the number 
of hours spent on the case determinative in computing fees." Cabrera v. Cottrell 694 P.2d 622. 624 
(Utah 1985). "In determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees, a trial judge may . . . consider, among 
other factors . . . the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case." Id., 694 P.2d at 625. 
By February 2008, the Defendants were aware of the election of remedies provision as a possible 
defense to the Selvigs' claims. That defense accepted as true the Selvigs' stated theory of the case. In 
this Court's view, it was incumbent upon the Defendants to raise the election of remedies defense in 
their subsequently filed motion for summary judgment. Doing so would have eliminated the need for all 
proceedings thereafter, including through trial. 
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Attorney's fees and costs were not reasonably incurred after October 3, 2008, the date the Court 
heard oral argument on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.2 For this reason, the Court 
concludes that the Defendants' claim for attorney's fees should be reduced by $89,990.00 
As to attorney's fees incurred prior to October 3, 2008, the Selvigs argue that (1) the Defendants 
are required to allocate fees to successful and unsuccessful claims; (2) the Defendants are not entitled to 
recover fees incurred during mediation because they did not participate in good faith; (3) attorney's fees 
incurred for co-counsel Ms. Ashbury to attend oral argument on the Selvigs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment are not reasonable; and (4) a mere estimate as to attorney's fees incurred in responding to 
post-trial motions is not a sufficient basis upon which the Court should award fees. 
The Defendants argue that (1) there is no requirement that Defendants allocate their attorney's 
fees to successful and unsuccessful defenses against the Selvigs' claims; (2) they participated in 
mediation in good faith, but the Selvigs did not; (3) Ms. Ashbury's attendance at oral argument was 
reasonable because she had done the research for and drafted the Defendants' response to the Selvigs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment; and (4) the law permits a party to make conservative estimates of 
attorney's fees incurred in briefing post-trial motions. Cabrera, 694 P.2d at 624. 
Under the REPC, the prevailing party is entitled recover attorney's fees in "any action arising out 
of the Contract." (REPC, j^ 17). The Selvigs' brought three causes of action in this case—breach of 
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. Clearly, the 
Selvigs' claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing arose out 
2This does not include post-trial motions related to attorney's fees and costs. The Court 
addresses this issue below. 
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of the REPC. Therefore, these causes of action constitute "compensable claims"—meaning claims upon 
which the prevailing party would be contractually entitled to recover attorney's fees. 
The Selvigs' claim for unjust enrichment is different. By its nature, this claim presupposes that 
no written or oral contract exists. Therefore, it would constitute a non-compensable claim—meanmg a 
claim upon which the prevailing party would not be contractually entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 
See, Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1987). Nevertheless, 
[Utah courts] have awarded fees to a prevailing party even though some of 
the fees may not have been incurred on strictly compensable issues, 
because proof of the compensable and non-compensable claims 
overlapped. For example, in [First General], a subcontractor sought to 
foreclose a mechanics' lien against a homeowner, and the homeowner 
counterclaimed alleging negligent workmanship. The subcontractor 
prevailed and sought recovery of its fees incurred in both the foreclosure 
of its lien and defense to the homeowner's counterclaim. . . . On appeal,. . 
. [we held] that the subcontractor was entitled to fees both in pursuing its 
affirmative claims and defending against the counterclaim because the two 
were inextricably tied together. In so holding, we recognized that where 
the proof of a compensable claim and otherwise non-compensable claim 
are closely related and require proof of the same facts, a successful party is 
entitled to recover its fees incurred in proving all of the related facts. 
Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 UT App. 335, ^ 12,991 P.2d 1113, quoting. Brown v. David K. Richards & Co.. 
1999 UT App 109, 978 P.2d 470, 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Here, the Selvigs' claim for unjust enrichment and the Selvigs' contract claims were closely 
related and required proof of the same facts. The Selvigs contended that the Defendants had been 
unjustly enriched by having retained the Kastle Inn, without having fulfilled their obligations under the 
REPC—specifically, the Defendants' obligations to transfer lot 139 to the Selvigs, and to grant them a 
$50,000 construction credit. These were the same facts upon which the Selvigs' contract claims were 
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founded. Accordingly, the prevailing party would be able to recover attorney's fees in prosecuting or 
defending against all claims arising out of these overlapping facts, including the Selvigs' claim for 
unjust enrichment. 
In summary, in this case there are two compensable claims. There is one non-compensable claim 
which is so factually intertwined with the compensable claims as to render it indistinguishable. 
Therefore, there are no non-compensable claims to which the Defendants must allocate their attorney's 
fees. The Defendants prevailed on all three claims. Therefore, there are no unsuccessful compensable 
claims to which the Defendants must allocate their attorney's fees. 
As to the remaining four issues raised in the Selvigs' Objection, the Court agrees with the 
Defendants. The Selvigs brought the claims in this action. They sought significant damages. This cast 
upon the Defendants the onus to defend. Considering the difficulty of the legal and factual issues 
presented, the efficiency of counsel, the number of hours billed, the fee customarily charged in the area, 
the outcome achieved, and the expertise of the Defendant's counsel, the Court finds that attorney's fees 
incurred prior to October 3, 2008 were necessary and reasonable. 
The Court is not persuaded that the Defendants failed to participate in mediation in good faith. 
As co-counsel, Ms. Ashbury researched and drafted the Defendants' response to the Selvigs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The fees incurred by the Defendants for her attendance at oral 
argument on the motion were reasonable and necessary. 
Finally, the law does permit counsel to make a reasonable estimate of fees incurred on post-trial 
motions. Considering the complexity of the issues presented and the extent of the post-trial briefing in 
this case, the Court finds that an estimate of $7,500.00 (20 hours) for post-trial work is reasonable. 
13
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For these reasons, the Court awards attorney's fees to the Defendants in the amount of 
$59,607.50. This represents the total attorney's fees claimed by the Defendants ($149,597.50), less 
attorney's fees incurred after October 3, 2008 ($89,990.00). 
The Selvigs' Objection To Defendants' 
Memorandum Of Costs 
Deposition costs are taxable "subject to the limitation that the trial court is persuaded that they 
were taken in good faith and, in the light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the 
development and presentation of the case." Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 
1042, 1051-52 (Utah 1984), citing, Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). Deposition 
costs are "necessary and reasonable where the development of the case is of such a complex nature that 
discovery cannot be accomplished through the less expensive method of interrogatories, requests for 
admissions and requests for production of documents." Highland, 683 P.2d at 1051-52. 
The Court is satisfied that the depositions of the Selvigs, Joan Steed, and Vince Isbell were taken 
in good faith and essential for the development and presentation of the case. Depositions were the 
swiftest way to determine the disputed facts about the REPC, the Lease to Purchase Agreement, and the 
intent of the parties in entering into them. Use of the depositions was necessary to prosecute and to 
defend against the motions for summary judgment filed. 
The Court is not persuaded that trial transcripts were essential for the development and 
presentation of the case. Had the Defendants pursued timely their election of remedies defense, no trial 
transcripts would have been produced. The transcripts were not essential to the filing of Defendant's 
motion for involuntary dismissal, and have been of little use in post-trial motions. 
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For these reasons, the Court awards taxable costs for depositions in the amount of $2,789.15.00. 
The costs of obtaining trial transcripts are not recoverable. 
Professionalism and Civility 
In the Reply Memorandum, counsel for the Selvigs correctly note the frequent and unfortunate 
tendency of the Defendants' counsel to "attribute improper motives" to opposing counsel without 
adequate factual basis. See, Stand. Of Prof. & Civility 3 ("Lawyers shall not, without an adequate 
factual basis, attribute to other counsel or the court improper motives, purpose, or conduct. . . Neither 
written submissions nor oral presentations should disparage the integrity, intelligence, morals, ethics, or 
personal behavior of an adversary unless such matters are directly relevant under controlling substantive 
law"). 
By way of illustration, the Defendants' papers filed with the Court include the following editorial 
comments regarding opposing counsel and the Selvigs' legal arguments: 
"Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider . . . is yet another episode in Plaintiffs' 
pattern of mischaracterizing Utah law. Without apology, Plaintiffs 
mischaracterize numerous Utah cases . . " (Def. Opp. To Plaintiffs' 
Motion To Reconsider, p. 1); 
"The extent to which the Selvigs' brief misrepresents the meaning of Utah 
law on critical points is breathtaking. Truly." (Def. Reply Memo. In 
Support of Motion For [Involuntary Dismissal], p. 1); 
"Either their counsel did not read the cases they have cited in their brief, or 
they assume that the Court will not read them and will simply believe their 
representations about what the cases say." (Id.); 
"[The Selvigs'] Memorandum . . . consists mostly of rambling, 
inconsistent, and ipse dixit argument and vague appeals for equity and 
'unique' remedies" (Id. at p. 2); and 
15 
"Instead the Selvigs make an insouciant attempt to waive away all the 
firmly established case law . . . by offering up pages of stream of 
consciousness argument" (I.d at p. 10). 
Sadly, during the course of this litigation, one of the Defendants' attorneys, without adequate 
factual basis, also attributed improper motives to the assigned judge. During trial, this attorney wrote to 
the assigned judge. (Letter, filed 2/12/09; Ruling of the Court, dated 2/13/09). She expressed concern 
regarding a question posed to her by the Court during oral argument. Specifically, she took issue with 
Court "look[ing] at the $74,000.00 paid on September 20, 2005 as a payment for the extension of the pay 
off on the loan." Id. 
The attorney wrote: "This is a position that never has been asserted by Plaintiffs or Defendants in 
this matter. . . . It deeply concerns me that you would independently create, then suggest to the Parties, a 
theory that could only assist the Plaintiffs in this matter." Id. In fact, this legal theory had been raised in 
the Selvigs' trial brief. Plaintiffs Trial Brief, p. 4 ("Under the [Lease to Purchase Agreement], as 
consideration for the extension of the closing date under the REPC, Defendants paid the Selvigs the 
remaining $74,000 down payment under the REPC"). 
Counsel for the Defendants are seasoned members of the Bar who should need no reminder that 
civility and professionalism are the hallmarks of our learned profession. (Utah Stand. Of Prof. & 
Civility, Preamble). By way of admonition, the Court reaffirms what the assigned judge wrote in 2004: 
Compliance with the Standards [of Professionalism and Civility] is reason 
enough to avoid such writing. But equally important is the fact that 
conclusory statements about the opposing party's arguments are not 
persuasive. They offer no assistance to the Court in deciding the merits of 
the case. If opposing counsel's position is "simplistic," "absurd," "simple-
minded," "unhelpful' or "specious," sound legal reasoning will eliminate 
any need to label it so. 
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Occasionally in oral presentations, counsel may use a term or expression 
that is overly harsh or critical. Such verbal slips - while ill-advised - are 
more understandable because they occur in the heat of argument. 
However, in written pleadings - where the advocate is at greater leisure to 
select terms, craft phrases, and construct sentences - more care should be 
taken. 
Pullan, D., Judge, "Learning Professionalism and Civility—Thoughts for New Members of The Bar, 
Utah Bar Journal, Aug. 2005. 
The common law is a vast and changing landscape. Its contours are shaped by the rulings in ten 
thousand cases past, and refined in the one case pending in the present. Not surprisingly, attorneys will 
often disagree in good faith about how the topography is evolving. The existence of such disagreements 
is not evidence that counsel are misrepresenting the lay of the land. Rather, it is evidence that the 
common law is alive, infused with a hopeful vitality and the promise of relevance to future generations. 
ORDER 
The Court denies the Selvigs' Motion to Reconsider, grants in part the Selvigs' Objection To 
Defendants' Request for Attorney's Fees, and grants in part the Selvigs' Objection To Defendants' 
Memorandum Of Costs. 
The Court awards attorney's fees in favor of the Defendants in the amount of $59,607.50. 
The Court awards taxable costs in favor of the Defendants in the amount of $2,789.15. 
The Court admonishes the Defendants' counsel to comply with the Standards of Professionalism 
and Civility in all further proceedings. 
The Court requests that the Defendants' counsel file an amended Judgment of Dismissal 
consistent with this Ruling and Order. 
DATED this U day of May, 2009. 
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BLOCKBUSTER ENTERPRISES, LC, 
HIGHLAND DEVELOPMENT, INC., and 
JOAN A. STEED, 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 060500324 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
This matter came before the Court for bench trial on January 30, February 2, 3, 6, and 9, 2009. 
Plaintiffs Steven W. Selvig and Barbara D. Selvig ("the Selvigs") were represented by Ms. Christina 
Jepson Schmutz and Ms. Laura S. Scott. Defendants Blockbuster Enterprises, LC ("Blockbuster"), 
Highland Development, Inc. ("HDP) and Ms. Joan Steed ("Ms. Steed") were represented by Ms. Mary 
Anne Q. Wood and Ms. Kathryn O. Balmforth. 
At the close of the Selvigs' case, Defendants moved for involuntary dismissal.1 URCP 41(b). 
The Defendants filed at that time a memorandum in support of the motion. The Court granted the 
Selvigs an opportunity to respond. On February 17, 2009, the Selvigs filed a memorandum in 
defendants captioned the motion: "Motion For Judgment As A Matter of Law." In 
substance, the motion is for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b). 
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opposition. On February 19, 2009, the Defendants filed a reply memorandum. The motion is now fully 
briefed and ready for decision. 
Having considered the evidence presented during the Selvigs' case in chief, the arguments of 
counsel, and the memoranda filed, the Court now enters the following: 
RULING 
Legal Standard For Deciding Motions For Involuntary Dismissal 
In an action tried by the court without a jury, "after the plaintiff. . . has completed the 
presentation of his evidence the defendant.. . may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts 
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." URCP 41(b). The Court may then "determine 
[the facts] and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render judgment until the close of 
all the evidence." Id. If the Court grants judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the Court is required to 
"make finding as provided in Rule 52(a)." Id. As a general rule2, unless otherwise specified, a dismissal 
under Rule 41(b), "operates as an adjudication on the merits." Id. 
In Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corporation. 873 P.2d 1141 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the 
Utah Court of Appeals explained: 
Dismissal under Rule 41(b) is appropriate in two circumstances: when the 
plaintiff has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie 
case, or when the trial court is not persuaded by the evidence introduced. 
Lemonv. Coates. 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987) accord, Handy v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co., 841 P.2d 1210, 1214-15 (Utah App. 1992). The trial court 
may grant a Rule 41 (b) motion even if the plaintiff has made out a priiha 
facie case. Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 
2
 A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for lack of an indispensable 
party, does not operate as an adjudication on the merits. URCP 41(b). 
? 
1985). In effect, the rule allows the trial court mto weigh the evidence, to 
draw inferences therefrom and, if it finds the evidence insufficient... to 
render a decision for the defendant on the merits.m Id. (quoting Winegar v. 
Slim Olson, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 491, 252 P.2d 205, 207 (1953)). 
Id., 873 P.2d at 1144. 
Findings of Fact 
The Selvigs Purchase and Operate The Kastle Inn 
1. In 2005, the Selvigs were the owners of the Kastle Inn ("the Inn") located in Midway, Wasatch 
County, State of Utah. The Selvigs operated the Inn as a bed and breakfast establishment. 
2. When the Selvigs purchased the Inn in 2003, they obtained a first mortgage for approximately 
$550,000.00. They also obtained a home equity line for approximately $70,000.00. The Selvigs 
purchased the contents of the Inn separately for $35,000.00. 
3. As owners of the Inn, the Selvigs invested approximately $100,000.00 to improve the property. 
They upgraded the kitchen to meet food service requirements, installed an outdoor water feature, 
installed a phone system, appliances, two additional jetted tubs, and a water treatment system. 
4. Notwithstanding these improvements and their marketing efforts, the Selvigs were ultimately 
unable to operate the Inn at a profit. Also, operating the inn and maintaining the grounds was 
more difficult work than the Selvigs had anticipated. Therefore, in the Spring of 2005, the 
Selvigs listed the Inn for sale with a real estate agent. 
Negotiations For The Sale of the Kastle Inn 
5. Sometime in the spring of 2005, Ms. Steed saw the for sale sign at the Inn and contacted the 
Selvigs directly. 
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6. On her first visit to the Inn, the Selvigs gave Ms. Steed a tour. They discussed the amount of 
indebtedness against the Inn and how the Selvigs had purchased the contents of the Inn 
separately. 
7. Over the next approximately two months, the parties negotiated the terms for the sale of the Inn. 
8. During negotiations, the Selvigs expressed their desire to be compensated for the improvements 
they made to the Inn. Ms. Steed was of the view that the Selvigs could not recover the full value 
of these improvements. 
9. During negotiations, Ms. Steed invited the Selvigs to visit the Utah Mini-Ranches, Ms. Steed's 
cabin development in Duchesne County. Ms. Steed proposed that as part of the purchase price 
for the Inn a cabin could be constructed for the Selvigs on a lot at the Utah Mini-Ranches. 
10. The Selvigs visited the Utah Mini-Ranches and inspected four or five cabins under construction 
in the development. 
11. During the visit, Ms. Steed told the Selvigs that she was "going to give the Selvigs a prime view 
lot." She stated that she would "like to have [the Selvigs] on Lot 139M and that the Selvigs 
"would be perfect there." 
12. Ultimately, the parties decided to incorporate as part of the purchase price for the Inn a 
$50,000.00 credit toward the construction of a cabin in the Utah Mini-Ranches development. 
According to the Selvigs, this amount represented a return of .50 cents on the dollar for the 
Selvigs' improvements to the Inn. 
13. According to the Selvigs, Ms. Steed told the Selvigs that Lot 139 was valued at $44,000.00. Ms. 
Steed offered to convey Lot 139 to the Selvigs in exchange for the contents of the Inn. 
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14. On June 9, 2005, Ms. Selvig and Ms. Steed walked through the Inn together. Ms. Selvig verbally 
identified those items of personal property that the Selvigs would be taking with them. 
The Real Estate Purchase Contract 
15. On June 12, 2005, Ms. Steed (as buyer) and the Selvigs (as sellers) entered into a "Commercial-
Industrial-Investment Real Estate Purchase Contract" for the sale of the Inn. 
16. The total purchase price was $759,139.00. This amount included3 $1,000.00 earnest money 
deposit, a $74,000.00 cash payment to be made at closing, and a $50,000.00 construction credit 
toward a cabin to be constructed for the Selvigs by HDL 
17. Additionally, Ms. Steed agreed to "assume" the first and second mortgage against the Inn. In the 
event there was "a problem with assumption, [Ms. Steed] would pay existing loans off at time of 
closing." (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, Addendum No. 3). The first mortgage secured repayment of 
$564,139.00. The second mortgage secured repayment of approximately $70,000.00. 
18. The REPC included three addenda. Addendum No. 2 reads as follows: 
THE MAJORITY OF ITEMS SEEN BY BUYER ON JUNE 9, 2005 
WILL BE APART OF THIS TRANSACTION WITH THE EXCEPTION 
OF THE ITEMS BARBARA SELVIG POINTED OUT TO BUYER. 
THERE WILL BE SEVERAL PERSONAL ITEMS WHICH WILL BE 
MUTUALLY AGREED UPON BY BUYER AND SELLER ON OR 
BEFORE JUNE 19, 2005.4 
3Under Addendum 2 of the REPC, the sale of the contents of the Inn was made "apart 
[sic] of this transaction." (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1, Addendum 2). Whether the parties intended 
to transfer Lot 139 to the Selvigs as compensation for the contents of the Inn is disputed. 
4The parties never met on or before June 19, 2005 to identify specific items of personal 
property that would not be part of the sale. 
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(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, Addendum No. 2). 
19. Addendum No. 3 to the REPC reads as follows: 
Buyer will put $75,000. cash down on this purchase, $1000.00 6/12/05 and 
$74,000. at closing 9/30/05 and will credit $50,000.00 in construction cost 
to build a home for [the Selvigs]. Total true value of down payment 
$125,000.00. Buyer will assume first and second mortgage, which will be 
current at time of closing. If there is a problem with assumption, buyer 
will pay existing loans off at time of closing. Seller will pay mortgage 
payment for July, August, and September, 2005 on both mortgages. 
Insurance will be prorated. 
Highland Development, Inc. will design and build a 28 x 44 ft. cabin, 6/12 
pitch completely finished with 2 bedrooms, 1- full bath, carpet/vinyl, 
heating system, loft and other items which come with this house package 
which will include Lot # 139, a prime view lot at no extra charge, located 
in Utah Mini Ranches Subdivision in Duchesne, Utah. 84021. 
The minimum cost value for the 28 ft. by 44 ft. house with lot 139 without 
any extras, will be $109,950. The minimum cost for a two car garage, 24 
ft. x 28 ft., with two windows, electric door and concrete pad will be 
$18,000. 
The additional cost for power tap, water tap, and installation of a septic 
tank system will be $9,800.00. 
The seller may exceed these costs with upgrades and additions mutually 
agreed upon during the finalization of the floorplan which will take place 
on or before Sept. 1, 2005. 
Seller will allow construction start to take place on or before February 1, 
2006. 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, Addendum 3). 
20. The parties agreed that the transaction would close and the Selvigs would deliver possession on 
or before September 30, 2005. 
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21. The REPC provided that "Closing" would occur when: 
(a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other . . . all 
documents required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow 
instructions signed by the Buyer and Seller, and by applicable law; (b) the 
moneys required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to 
the escrow/title company in the form of collected or cleared funds; and (c) 
the deed the Seller has agreed to deliver under Subsection 6 has been 
recorded. 
(Plaintiffs'Exhibit 1 4 3). 
22. The REPC defined the remedies of the parties upon default: 
If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect to either retain the Earnest Money 
Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the Earnest Money deposit and 
sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights. If Seller defaults, in addition to return 
of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept from 
Seller as liquidated damages a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit or 
sue Seller for specific performance and/or damages. . . . Where a Section 
of this Contract provides a specific remedy, the parties intend that the 
remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be 
available under common law. 
(Plaintiffs'Exhibit I, f 16). 
23. The REPC, with its addenda, constituted "the entire Contract between the parties and 
supersede[d] all prior dealings between the parties." The REPC could not be changed "except by 
written agreement of the parties." (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, ^|14). 
24. In any action arising out of the REPC, the "prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees." (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1,^17). 
25. The REPC was a standard form contract. Ms. Steed filled in the blanks and checked the boxes. 
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The Events of September 20, 2005 
26. Because the Selvigs wanted to go to New York for a vacation, the parties agreed to meet at the 
Inn on September 20, 2005, purportedly to close the transaction. 
27. Mr. and Ms. Selvig each testified that they expected that on September 20, 2005, Ms. Steed 
would either have (1) paid off the first and second mortgages, or (2) assumed the mortgages so 
that the Selvigs were released from liability for the indebtedness. 
28. When Ms. Steed arrived, she told the Selvigs "I don't have the mortgages paid off. I didn't do 
the assumption." 
29. Ms. Steed brought with her and presented to the Selvigs a one-page Lease to Purchase 
Agreement. The Lease to Purchase Agreement reads as follows: 
Blockbuster Enterprises, LC (Buyer) a limited liability company organized 
and existing under the laws of the state of Utah, agrees to lease to purchase 
the Kastle Inn located at 1220 Interlaken Dr., Midway, Ut. From Steven 
W. Selvig and Barbara D. Selvig (Seller) for a period of 12 months. Buyer 
will assume Seller's monthly payments in the amount of $3,521.90 on the 
first mortgage and a payment of $491.33 on the second mortgage. Both 
payments coming due on the first of each and every month. The first 
payment beginning October 1, 2005. On the 13th month, September 1, 
2006, Buyer agrees to pay off the balances owed on both mortgages. 
Seller agrees to bring all taxes and insurances current. Buyer will be 
responsible for taxes and insurances October 1, 2005. Buyer will be 
responsible for any late fees which may occur during this 12 month period. 
This Agreement is based upon a free [and] clear title other than the first 
and second mortgage. Total purchase price $759,139.00. 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3). 
30. The Selvigs testified that the Least to Purchase Agreement was a surprise to them. The Selvigs 
had stopped taking reservations for the Inn and packed to move. Under these circumstances, the 
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Selvigs felt they had little choice but to sign the Lease to Purchase Agreement. 
31. Ms. Steed testified that before executing the REPC, she and the Selvigs had discussed the 
possibility of a Lease to Purchase Agreement and the Selvigs orally agreed that this would be 
acceptable. 
32. Whether the Selvigs were or were not surprised by the Lease to Purchase Agreement presented to 
them on September 20, 2005, they signed it. 
33. In her deposition, Ms. Steed referred to the Lease to Purchase Agreement as an addendum to the 
REPC. 
34. Under the Lease to Purchase Agreement, Blockbuster was substituted as the Buyer. 
35. On September 20, 2005, Ms. Steed also produce a warranty deed for the Inn. Ms. Steed told the 
Selvigs that she "would hold on to [the warranty deed] until we close." 
36. Relying on this representation, the Selvigs signed the warranty deed and gave it to Ms. Steed. 
37. Ms. Steed paid the Selvigs $74,000.00. 
38. The Selvigs left for New York and Blockbuster took possession of the Inn. 
39. On September 20, 2005, Ms. Steed did not tender to the Selvigs all of the moneys required to be 
paid under the REPC in the form of cleared or collected funds. 
40. On September 20, 2005, the warranty deed was not recorded. 
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Events Occurring Between September 20, 2005 and October J, 2006 
41. From September 20, 2005 through September 1, 2006, Blockbuster occupied and paid property 
taxes on the Inn. During this period, with one exception25, Blockbuster made timely monthly 
payments toward the first and second mortgage. 
42. On March 28, 2006, Blockbuster6 caused a check in the amount of $69,990.57 to be issued to 
Country-Wide Home Loans Servicing, paying off the second mortgage in full. 
43. September 1, 2006 came and Blockbuster did not pay off the first mortgage. 
44. Sometime in early September, Ms. Steed contacted the Selvigs to discuss the possibility of the 
Selvigs returning to the Inn as inn-keepers for the 2006-07 ski season. 
45. The Selvigs expressed an interest and the parties met at the Inn one week later. There, they 
discussed what steps would be necessary to begin operation, including lodging, terms of 
occupancy, permits, utilities, advertising, necessary equipment, the division of responsibilities, 
the need for a credit card machine, and how food would be purchased. 
46. During this discussion, Ms. Selvig expressed to Ms. Steed that "we need to get this deal 
[referring to payment of the first mortgage] finished." Ms. Steed stated that she would "talk to 
Joe [her husband] about it." This was the last time the parties discussed with each other payment 
I^n February 2006, Blockbuster's payment on the second mortgage was late. The reason 
for the late payment is not particularly clear, but it may have resulted from a clerical error by the 
bank. The parties met on March 14, 2006 to discuss the late payment and construction of the 
Selvigs' cabin. It was at this meeting, that Ms. Steed's husband first suggested that Blockbuster 
simply pay off the second mortgage early. 
'The official check was drawn on the Zion's Bank account of Frank J. Steed, Ms. Steed's 
husband. 
10 
ol the Fust moitgage 
47 Ultimately, it was decided the Ms Selvig would investigate the issues 1 elated to opening the Inn 
and dialt the terms undei which the Selvigs would leturn as inn-keepers 
48 Octobei 1 2006 came and Blockbuster did not pay off the Fust moitgage 
49 On Octobei 3, 2006, Mr Selvig went to the Inn sometime before 9 00 a m The purpose of his 
visit was to determine what repairs or impiovements would be necessary before the Inn could be 
reopened He determined that one deck on the Inn had been stripped of its planks, leaving the 
joists exposed The watei Feature had not been maintained The water system was without salt 
A Fence and gazebo had been removed 
50 After inspecting the piopeity, Mr Selvig called Ms Steed between 9 00 a m and 10 00 a m In a 
heated conversation, Mi Selvig told Ms Steed that there was uno way he could get the Inn ready 
foi occupants by Octobei, and that he did not work Foi $6 00 per hour " Ms Steed responded 
"You don't have to I guess this isn't going to work out " 
51 Whatevei else was said dining this conversation, Ms Steed concluded that the Selvigs intended 
to teiminate the REPC and Lease to Purchase Agreement7 Therefore, she went immediately to 
the Wasatch County Recorder's Office where she recorded the warranty deed For the Inn Ms 
Steed lecorded the deed at 11 26 a m on October 3, 2006 (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4) 
7Ms Steed testified that she feared that the Selvigs would "sell the Inn out From under 
hei If this happened, Ms Steed and Blockbuster ran the nsk oF forfeiting the earnest money, 
the down payment, the pay off on the second mortgage, the other monthly mortgage payments, 
and the value of their own improvements to the Inn See, Declaration of Joan Steed, ^ 27, 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1, filed Feb 29, 2008 
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52. At 12:17 p.m. on October 3, 2006, Ms. Steed left a message on the Selvigs' answering machine. 
She stated: "This is Joan. This is not going to work. Come and get your stuff." 
Commencement of This Action and Pay Off On the First Mortgage 
53. As stated, neither Ms. Steed nor Blockbuster paid off the first mortgage by September 1, 2006. 
54. On October 3, 2006—the date Ms. Steed recorded the warranty deed—Blockbuster had not paid 
off the first mortgage. 
55. Blockbuster did make timely monthly payments on the first mortgage in September, October, and 
November 2006. 
56. The Selvigs filed the complaint in this action on October 12, 2006. 
57. In their Complaint, the Selvigs allege three causes of action—breach of contract, breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. 
58. The Selvigs did not return the $1,000.00 earnest money deposit to Ms. Steed before commencing 
suit. 
59. On November 29, 2006, Blockbuster8 caused a check in the amount of $553,775.31 to be issued 
to Country-Wide Home Loans Servicing, paying off the first mortgage in full. 
Construction of The Cabin 
60. The parties blame each other for the failure of HDI to construct a cabin on Lot 139 in the Utah 
Mini-Ranches. Whatever the reason, Lot 139 has never been conveyed to the Selvigs and HDI 
sAgain, the official check was written on a Zion's Bank Account in the name of Frank J. 
Steed. The following information appears in different type on the check: "Countrywide Loan 
#41069278-4, Steven W. & Barbara D. Selvig, 1220 North Interlaken Lane, Midway UT 84049/' 
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has never constructed a cabin on Lot 139 for them. 
Conclusions of Law 
The REPC And The Lease To Purchase Agreement Form A Single Agreement 
The Court agrees with the analysis set forth in Part LA of the Selvigs' Trial Brief. (Plaintiffs' 
Trial Brief, filed Jan. 27, 2009). The REPC and the Lease to Purchase Agreement form a single 
agreement for the purchase of the Inn. The evidence presented at trial supports this conclusion. 
The REPC was signed on June 12, 2005. The Lease to Purchase Agreement was signed just over 
three months later. The agreements relate to the same transaction and state the terms of that transaction. 
The Lease to Purchase Agreement cannot be understood without reference to the REPC. There is 
nothing in the Lease to Purchase Agreement suggesting that it supersedes the REPC. Ms. Steed herself 
referred to the Lease to Purchase Agreement as an addendum to the REPC. The Lease to Purchase 
Agreement substituted Blockbuster as the Buyer. However, this occurred with the consent of the parties. 
The Events of September 20, 2005 Did Not Constitute A Closing 
Under the REPC, a closing occurs when: 
(a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other . . . all 
documents required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow 
instructions signed by the Buyer and Seller, and by applicable law; (b) the 
moneys required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to 
the escrow/title company in the form of collected or cleared funds; and (c) 
the deed the Seller has agreed to deliver under Subsection 6 has been 
recorded. 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, % 3). Using this definition, the events of September 20, 2005 did not constitute a 
closing of the REPC. 
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Ms. Steed did not tender to the Selvigs all of the moneys required to be paid under the REPC in 
the form of cleared or collected funds. The Selvigs executed a warranty deed, but did so without the 
present intent to convey the property. In fact, Ms. Steed agreed to "hold on to [the warranty deed] until 
we close." The deed was not recorded until October 3, 2006, more than one year later. Because no 
closing occurred, the REPC did not merge into the deed. Its terms—as supplemented and modified by 
the Lease to Purchase Agreement—remained in full force9 after September 20, 2005. 
By Retaining The Earnest Money, the Selvigs Elected Their Remedy 
In the REPC, the Selvigs and Ms. Steed agreed to the following provision: 
If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect to either retain the Earnest Money 
Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the Earnest Money deposit and 
sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights. . . . Where a Section of this Contract 
provides a specific remedy, the parties intend that the remedy shall be 
exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under 
common law. 
(Exhibit 1, % 16). In this case, the Selvigs did not return the $1,000.00 earnest money deposit before 
filing suit against the Defendants. 
9The REPC provided that "time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this 
transaction" and that "extensions must be agreed to in writing." (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, %2\). As a 
general rule, a "time is of the essence" provision means that any failure to perform timely 
constitutes a material breach. However, the Selvigs and Defendants, by course of performance, 
demonstrated that time was not of the essence to them. 
For example, by June 19, 2005, the parties were to "mutually agree" upon which 
"personal items" would not be transferred to Ms. Steed as part of the sale of the Inn. This never 
occurred. The parties were to reach mutual agreement on upgrades and additions to the Selvigs' 
cabin and finalize the floor plan on or before September 1, 2005. The Selvigs met with Mr. 
Isbell and agreed to a rough design before September 1, 2005, but floor plans were not finalized 
by that date. Construction on the cabin did not commence on or before February 1, 2006. The 
Selvigs knew that Blockbuster had not paid off the first mortgage by September 1, 2006, but did 
not give notice of termination until at the earliest October 3, 2006. 
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Under Utah law, the effect of the Selvigs' decision to retain the earnest money is clear. In 
McKeon v. Crump, 2002 UT App. 258, 53 P.3d 494, the parties entered into a "standardized real estate 
agreement" for the sale of the McKeons' home. Id., at P6. The agreement included the following 
provision: 
If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money 
Deposit as liquidated damages, or to return it and sue Buyer to specifically 
enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. 
Id. Before closing, a dispute arose over the appraisal. On December 2, 1999, the McKeons filed a 
lawsuit against the Crumps seeking specific performance and damages. The McKeons "had not returned 
the [$2,500.00] earnest money deposit to the Crumps prior to filing suit." Id., at P3. Approximately 
three months after filing suit, the McKeons filed a motion to deposit the earnest money into the Court. 
The Crumps opposed the motion. Finally, on May 19, 2000, the McKeons returned the earnest money 
deposit to the Crumps. 
The case went to trial in the summer of 2000. At the close of the McKeons' case, the Crumps 
moved to dismiss on the ground that the McKeons had failed to return the earnest money deposit before 
filing suit. The trial court granted the motion. The McKeons appealed. 
The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling. The holding of the McKeon Court is 
clear. First, an election of remedies clause in a real estate purchase contract exists primarily for the 
benefit of the seller. The seller will "always choose the option to his advantage and to the disadvantage 
of the buyer." Therefore, "under those circumstances, the clause should be strictly applied against the 
sellei and he should be held to meet its requirements with exactness." Id., at P6, quoting, Close v. 
BlumenthaK 11 Utah 2d 51, 354 P.2d 856, 857 (1960). 
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Second, a seller subject to an election of remedies clause has a duty to release her interest in the 
earnest money deposit to the buyer before filing a suit for damages. Id.. PP8-10, citing, Palmer v. Hayes, 
892 ).2d 1059, 1061-62 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (seller had "an affirmative duty to release their interest in 
the deposit money to the [buyers] before commencing suit for damages;" failure to do so constitutes "as 
a matter of law, an election of the remedy of liquidated damages"); Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 
335 P.2d 404 (1959). The Palmer Court explained that "the [Andreasen line of] cases uniformly hold 
that before a seller may pursue a remedy other than liquidated damages, the seller must release any claim 
to the deposit money." Id., at 1062. 
Third, "the election of remedies defense under these conditions cannot be waived." McKeon, 
2002 UT App. 258, PI5 , citing, Palmer, 892 P.2d at 1062. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited 
favorably the concurring opinion of Justice Henriod in Andreasen: 
It was agreed that the sellers, at their option, could retain the amount 
advanced as liquidated damages if the buyers broke their promise. The 
buyers broke their promise and the sellers retained the amount advanced. 
In my opinion such retention constituted an exercise of the option and 
precluded the sellers from pursuing any other remedy. It is inconsistent for 
the sellers to insist on holding the buyers to the terms of the contract and at 
the same time retain the money that they agreed would be the measure of 
damages upon breach, if they retained it. Such inconsistency must be 
resolved against the sellers who not only furnished the printed contract, 
but who had the power of election, 
Andreasen, 335 P.2d at 403 (Henriod, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
The Selvigs' reliance upon U.S. General, Inc. v. Jenson, 2005 UT App. 497, 128 P.3d 56, is 
misplaced. The contract at issue in U.S. General was "not a standardized real estate contract but an 
option contract." Id., at P25. Moreover, the option contract did "not specify alternative remedies of 
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either retaining the Deposit or pursuing other remedies."10 Id., at P26. In fact, the U.S. General Court 
ruled that McKeon was "inapplicable to the case at bar." Id., at P25. 
The Selvigs argue that McKeon applies only to circumstances in which the seller seeks damages 
arising from the buyer's "failure to complete [the] purchase." (Selvigs' Opposition Memo., p.6). The 
Selvigs then assert that their damages arise not from the Defendants' failure to pay the entire purchase 
price by September 1, 2006, but from the subsequent "improper taking of [the Selvigs'] land." (Selvigs' 
Opposition Memo., p. 4). 
The Court is not persuaded that McKeon applies only when damages arise out of the failure to 
close a real estate purchase transaction. Even if this were so, the Selvigs' contract claims do arise out of 
the Defendants failure to close the REPC and Least to Purchase Agreement by paying the full purchase 
price by September 1, 2006. The Selvigs would have no claim for possession of the Inn absent this 
alleged breach. 
No matter how the Selvigs characterize the breach from which their damages arise, they had an 
affirmative duty to relinquish control of the earnest money deposit before filing suit. If an election of 
remedies clause exists in a real estate purchase contract, retaining the earnest money deposit is 
"incontrovertible evidence that the seller . . . exercised the option to keep it . . . for the purpose indicated 
in the contract, that is, as liquidated damages." Close v. Blumenthal 11 Utah 2d 51, 354 P.2d 856, 857 
(1960). The law "does not allow a seller to choose liquidated damages, and then elect again if he or she 
l0The default provision of the option contract in U.S. General read: "Following a material 
default by either Buyer or Seller, the other party may pursue any remedies or damages available 
at law or in equity." U.S. General, 2005 UT App. 497, P6. 
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is unsatisfied by the first choice." McKeon, 2002 UT App. 258, PI5. 
To rule otherwise would be to free the seller from the terms of the very contract he seeks to 
enforce. 'That seller has his choice [of remedies] is enough without giving him the advantage of both 
alternatives and thus providing two strings to his bow." Id., citing, Close, 354 P.2d at 857. 
For these reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal of the Selvigs' 
claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
The Selvigs9 Claim For Unjust Enrichment 
The Selvigs argue that their decision to retain the earnest money does not preclude them from 
seeking to recover damages under a theory of unjust enrichment. The Court disagrees. 
Nothing in McKeon suggests that equitable claims can be pursued, notwithstanding the seller's 
election of liquidated damages. Moreover, recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment—one branch of 
quantum meruit—"presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists." Davies v. Olsen, 
746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1987). Here, an enforceable written contract existed between the parties. 
For these reasons, the Court grants the Defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal of the 
Selvigs' claim for unjust enrichment. 
Attorney's Fees and Costs 
In any action arising out of the REPC, the "prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees." (Exhibit 1, ^ ] 17). The Selvigs' civil action arose out of the REPC, as 
amended by the Lease to Purchase Agreement. As the prevailing party, Defendants are entitled to an 
award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
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ORDER 
Acting pursuant to Rule 41(b), the Court grants Defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal as 
to all of the Selvigs' claims. This decision operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
The Court awards reasonable attorney's fees and costs to Defendants. Counsel for Defendants 
shall file an attorney's fees affidavit within 20 days of the date of this mling. The affidavit shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 73. With respect to their claims for costs, Defendants shall comply 
with the procedural requirements in Rule 54(d). 
The remaining trial dates currently scheduled are stricken. 
The Court requests that counsel for Defendants prepare a judgment consistent with this Ruling 
and Order. 
DATED this ?b day of February, 2008. 
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